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1 See, e.g., Yaron S. Rabinowitz, Keratoconus, 42 SURV. OPHTHALMOLOGY 297, 298-99
(1998) (“Keratoconus is a condition in which the cornea assumes a conical shape as a result of
noninflammatory thinning of the corneal stroma.  The corneal thinning induces irregular
astigmatism, myopia, and protrusion, leading to mild to marked impairment in the quality of
vision.  It is a progressive disorder ultimately affecting both eyes . . . .”); Karla Zadnik et al.,
Biomicroscopic Signs and Disease Severity in Keratoconus, 15 CORNEA 139, 139 (1996)
(“Keratoconus is characterized by symptoms of visual distortion, observable corneal irregularity
that steepens with time, classic slit-lamp biomicroscopic signs (Vogt’s striae and Fleischer’s
ring), and progressive corneal scarring.”) (citation omitted).
2 See, e.g., Kurt A. Buzard & Bradley R. Fundingsland, Corneal Transplant for
Keratoconus: Results in Early and Late Disease, 23 J. CATARACT & REFRACTIVE SURGERY 398,
405 (1997) (“[T]he results of this study indicate that . . . corneal transplantation [is] the primary
choice for permanently eliminating visual problems in eyes with early and moderate
keratoconus.”); Rabinowitz, supra note 1, at 315 (“Corneal transplant (penetrating keratoplasty)
is the best and most successful surgical option for keratoconus patients who cannot tolerate
contact lenses or are not adequately visually rehabilitated by them.  Central scarring may
preclude good vision from contact lenses, even when they are tolerated.”).
3 See, e.g., M.L. Chipman et al., Changing Risk for Early Transplant Failure: Data from
the Ontario Corneal Recipient Registry, 28 CANADIAN J. OPHTHALMOLOGY 254, 254 (1993)
(“To examine the joint effects of donor, recipient and surgical characteristics on the risk of early
corneal transplant failure, 73 cases of early failure (no period of clarity or clarity lasting no more
than 28 days) reported to the Ontario Corneal Recipient Registry were compared with 1591
control transplants remaining clear for 6 months or more.  In logistic regression models donor
age was significantly associated with graft failure, with the odds of failure increasing by 24% per
decade.  In recipients with a history of cataract or glaucoma or with an intraocular lens in place
the relative odds of failure ranged from 2.16 to 3.08.  Among surgical factors, larger grafts
increased risk by 45% per 0.25 mm.”); Rabinowitz, supra note 1, at 315 (“Because of the
avascular nature of the cornea, corneal transplant has a success rate of 93–96%. . . . Complete
visual recovery may, however, take as long as 6 months.  Patients who are candidates for
penetrating keratoplasty should be counseled that in spite of the high success rate of surgery there
is still a 50% chance that they may need contact lenses, either because of residual myopia or
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INTRODUCTION
It is an open question whether the prohibition on employment discrimination in the
Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA) protects plaintiffs who have not attempted to mitigate
the effect of their disability on their ability to work.  Suppose, for example, that a job applicant
has severely impaired vision because of a corneal disease.1  He can have corneal transplant
surgery that his doctors recommend and expect will allow him to see much more clearly,2 but he
does not want to have the surgery because of the complications sometimes associated with the
operation and the possibility that the surgery will not work.3  He applies for a job that has been
postkeratoplasty astigmatism.”); id. at 316 (“In compliant patients, complications after
penetrating keratoplasty are rare.  These may include rejection, postoperative astigmatism, a
fixed dilated pupil, and recurrence of keratoconus.”).
4 42 U.S.C. §§ 12111-12117 (2000).
5 Id. § 12112(a).
6 For a discussion of the sparse existing literature, see infra note 54 and accompanying
text.
7 For cases holding that courts will consider only mitigation that the plaintiff has
undertaken, see Nawrot v. CPC Int’l, 277 F.3d 896, 904 (7th Cir. 2002); Williams v. Thresholds,
Inc., No. 02 C 9101, slip op. at 9-10 (N.D. Ill. Sept. 22, 2003); EEOC v. Voss Elec. Co., 257 F.
Supp. 2d 1354, 1358 & n.2 (W.D. Okla. 2003); Bertinetti v. Joy Mining Mach., 231 F. Supp. 2d
828, 833-34 (S.D. Ill. 2002); Finical v. Collections Unlimited, Inc., 65 F. Supp. 2d 1032, 1037
(D. Ariz. 1999); infra note 53 and accompanying text.  For a case holding that a failure to
mitigate reduces the plaintiff’s damage award, but does not defeat the plaintiff’s claim, see
Capizzi v. County of Placer, 135 F. Supp. 2d 1105, 1112-13 (E.D. Cal. 2001); infra note 53 and
accompanying text.  For cases holding or suggesting that plaintiffs are under a duty to mitigate,
see cases cited infra note 8.  For a case in which the defendant raised the duty to mitigate issue,
but the court did not reach it, see Fraser v. United States Bancorp, 168 F. Supp. 2d 1188, 1193
(D. Or. 2001).
8 For cases finding a duty to mitigate, see Johnson v. Maynard, No. 01 Civ 7393(AKH),
slip op. at __ (S.D.N.Y. Feb. 25, 2003); Hooper v. Saint Rose Parish, 205 F. Supp. 2d 926, 929
(N.D. Ill. 2002); Rose v. Home Depot U.S.A., Inc., 186 F. Supp. 2d 595, 614 (D. Md. 2002);
Hewitt v. Alcan Aluminum Corp., 185 F. Supp. 2d 183, 189 (N.D.N.Y. 2001); Tangires v. Johns
Hopkins Hosp., 79 F. Supp. 2d 587, 596 (D. Md. 2000), aff’d, 230 F.3d 1354 (4th Cir. 2000)
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structured for people who can see clearly, and asks the employer to purchase work equipment
(like a new computer) that will enable him to perform the job with limited eyesight.  Purchasing
this equipment will be costly, and the employer asks why it should have to bear those costs when
the applicant could have surgery to enable him to see better.
The question raises a core issue of rights and responsibilities under a civil rights law.  But
Title I of the ADA,4 which protects “a qualified individual with a disability” from employment
discrimination based on his disability,5 never indicates whether there is a duty to mitigate, either
by undergoing medical procedures, using medication, pursuing physical therapy, losing weight,
abstaining from alcohol and cigarettes, or taking other measures to improve health and eliminate
obstacles to employment.  The Supreme Court has not yet considered the question, and legal
commentators have all but ignored it.6  The few lower courts to address a duty to mitigate under
Title I are divided on whether mitigation should be required,7 and those in favor of the duty have
not developed a clear standard for when that duty should apply.8  To the extent that the decisions
(mem.); infra notes 66-70 and accompanying text.  For cases that seem to suggest, less clearly,
that there is a duty to mitigate, see Hill v. Kan. City Area Transp. Auth., 181 F.3d 891, 894 (8th
Cir. 1999); Mont-Ros v. City of West Miami, 111 F. Supp. 2d 1338, 1356-57 (S.D. Fla. 2000);
Llante v. Am. NTN Bearing Mfg. Corp., No. 99 C 3091, slip op. at 12 (N.D. Ill. Nov. 15, 1999);
Spradley v. Custom Campers, Inc., 68 F. Supp. 2d 1225, 1232-33 (D. Kan. 1999); Roberts v.
County of Fairfax, Virginia, 937 F. Supp. 541, 548 (E.D. Va. 1996); infra notes 69, 71 and
accompanying text.
9 See infra text accompanying notes 72-104.
10 See Rose, 186 F. Supp. 2d at 614-15, 614 n.7.
11 See Fraser, 168 F. Supp. 2d at 1191.
12 See Mont-Ros, 111 F. Supp. 2d at 1346, 1356.
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supporting a duty to mitigate imply any principle for implementing the duty, most appear to
suggest that Title I plaintiffs are obligated to mitigate whenever mitigation is possible.  I reject
both extremes of the existing debate.  This Article argues that plaintiffs seeking Title I protection
should be under a duty to mitigate, but that this duty should require plaintiffs to pursue only those
mitigating measures that could reduce their need for workplace accommodation and that a
reasonable person in the same situation would pursue.
The question of whether, when, and why there is a duty to mitigate under Title I is
important both doctrinally and theoretically, and courts enforcing Title I of the ADA will
inevitably have to decide it.  Employer-defendants are beginning to press the issue, and existing
ADA case law—combined with tort jurisprudence, medical literature, and disabled people’s own
accounts—makes clear that some people do not mitigate their disabilities when mitigation is
possible.
First, many disabled people do not want to bear the risks or side effects associated with
some mitigating procedures.  These risks and side effects range from the very serious to the less
so.  The failure rates for mitigating measures vary widely.  The side effects associated with
mitigation may be mild, but may also entail permanent neurological damage, impaired memory,
impaired cognitive function, dulled creativity, aggressive behavior, hyperactivity, tremors,
seizures, blurred vision, hypothyroidism, blood disorders, liver damage, sedation, sleep
disturbances, sexual dysfunction, weight gain, birth defects for one’s children, pain, or death.9
Second, some disabled people are unable or unwilling to avoid practices and
conditions—like smoking, drinking alcohol, or being substantially overweight—that harm their
overall health and can intensify the consequences of their disabilities.  District courts have
already considered Title I suits brought by a plaintiff who did not stop smoking when his doctor
advised him that smoking aggravated his respiratory problems,10 by a plaintiff who did not
abstain from alcohol and start exercising when her doctor advised her that doing so would help
control her diabetes,11 and by a plaintiff who did not lose weight when his doctors advised him
that weight loss would alleviate his sleep apnea.12  More cases like these are certain to arise.
13 See McGee v. Jones, 499 S.E.2d 398, 400-01 (Ga. Ct. App. 1998).
14 See Seagers v. Pailet, 656 So. 2d 700, 713-14 (La. Ct. App. 1995).
15 See Gunn v. Robertson, 801 So. 2d 555, 561 (La. Ct. App. 2001); Dunn v. Maxey, 693
N.E.2d 1138, 1139 (Ohio Ct. App. 1997).
16 See Etheredge v. St. Paul Mercury Ins. Co., 814 So. 2d 119, 121-23 (La. Ct. App.
2002).
17 See infra text accompanying note 72.
18 See infra text accompanying notes 73-75.
19 Edward Dolnick, Deafness as Culture, ATLANTIC, Sept. 1993, at 37, 38 (quoting
Roslyn Rosen).
20 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2 (2000).
21 See, e.g., Erickson v. Bd. of Governors of State Colls. & Univs. for Northeastern Ill.
Univ., 207 F.3d 945, 949 (7th Cir. 2000) (“Title I of the ADA, by contrast [with, inter alia, Title
VII], requires employers to consider and to accommodate disabilities, and in the process extends
beyond the anti-discrimination principle.”); Harter v. Univ. of Indianapolis, 5 F. Supp. 2d 657,
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Third, some disabled people are unable to afford some, or any, mitigating measures.  The
jurisprudence on people injured by tort, for example, reveals disabled people unable to pay for
surgery that Medicaid would not cover,13 unable to pay for surgery that their health insurance
would not cover,14 unable to pay for surgery because they had no health insurance,15 and unable
to take time off from work so that an injury could heal because they had no disability insurance
to support them in the interim.16
Fourth, some disabled people, members of the deaf community most prominent among
them, publicly state that they do not attempt to mitigate because they understand their disabilities
to be central to their cultural identities.  Cochlear implant surgery, for example, has enabled some
deaf people to process sounds well enough to understand speech.17  Some deaf people, however,
refuse the surgery, not because of its considerable risks and limitations,18 but because they
believe that their deafness is a crucial part of who they are.  A president of the National
Association of the Deaf, for instance, has expressed such sentiments: “‘I’m happy with who I
am,’” she has declared, “‘and I don’t want to be ‘fixed.’’”19
In addition to the practical urgency of resolving the duty to mitigate question, examining
the issue of whether there is a duty to mitigate under Title I also casts new light on an important
debate in the Title I case law and scholarship about the extent of the differences between Title I
of the ADA and Title VII of the 1964 Civil Rights Act, which prohibits employment
discrimination based on “race, color, religion, sex, or national origin.”20  The traditional view in
this debate, advanced by many courts21 and commentators,22 holds that Title I and 
661 (S.D. Ind. 1998) (“Unlike other federal employment discrimination laws [including Title
VII], the ADA does not simply forbid discrimination on a particular basis.  The ADA imposes an
affirmative duty on employers to provide ‘reasonable accommodations’ for a disabled
employee.”) (citations omitted); Dunlap v. Ass’n of Bay Area Gov’ts, 996 F. Supp. 962, 966
(N.D. Cal. 1998) (“[T]he analogy between race and gender discrimination claims brought under
Title VII and disability discrimination claims brought under the ADA is extremely limited.  In an
action for race or gender discrimination, a plaintiff must prove that she was treated differently
from those similarly situated because of a protected characteristic.  In contrast, under the ADA, a
person with a disability need not prove that she was treated differently from non-disabled
individuals.  Discrimination may be shown precisely where the defendant treated plaintiff the
same as everyone around her, despite her need for reasonable accommodation.”) (citation
omitted).
22 See, e.g., Pamela S. Karlan & George Rutherglen, Disabilities, Discrimination, and
Reasonable Accommodation, 46 DUKE L.J. 1, 3 (1996) (“[U]nder the civil rights statutes that
protect women, blacks, or older workers, plaintiffs can complain of discrimination against them,
but they cannot insist upon discrimination in their favor; disabled individuals often can.”)
(footnote omitted); id. at 9 (“[T]he ADA declares it illegal to deny an individual an employment
opportunity by failing to take account of her disability when taking account of it—in the sense of
changing the job or physical environment of the workplace—would enable her to do the work. 
This is a far different definition of ‘discrimination’ than the definition embraced in other areas of
employment discrimination law.  Title VII, for instance, essentially takes jobs as it finds
them. . . . The failure to undertake positive steps to revamp the job or the environment does not
constitute discrimination.”); Linda Hamilton Krieger, Foreword—Backlash Against the ADA:
Interdisciplinary Perspectives and Implications for Social Justice Strategies, 21 BERKELEY J.
EMP. & LAB. L. 1, 3-4 (2000) (“The ADA incorporated a profoundly different model of equality
from that associated with traditional non-discrimination statutes like Title VII of the Civil Rights
Act of 1964.  Those statutes, for the most part, were geared toward achieving only formal
equality: equal treatment of similarly situated individuals. . . . The ADA required not only that
disabled individuals be treated no worse than non-disabled individuals with whom they were
similarly situated, but also directed that in certain contexts they be treated differently, arguably
better, to achieve an equal effect.”) (footnotes omitted); Stewart J. Schwab & Steven L. Willborn,
Reasonable Accommodation of Workplace Disabilities, 44 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1197, 1199-
1200 (2003) (“The Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990 (ADA) differs fundamentally from
Title VII. . . . The central thrust of Title VII employs a ‘sameness’ model of discrimination,
requiring employers to treat African Americans and women exactly the same as others; their race
and sex must be ignored and employers must focus instead on factors related to productivity. 
Although the ADA uses a sameness model in part, its distinctive thrust is a ‘difference’ model,
requiring employers to treat individuals with disabilities differently and more favorably than
others.  Employers must treat individuals with disabilities as qualified if they ‘can perform the
essential functions’ of the job.  Employers are free to treat others as qualified only if they can
perform all of the functions of the job.  Similarly, employers must make ‘reasonable
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accommodations’ for individuals with disabilities.  Sometimes these accommodations may be
expensive or require significant alterations in the way a job is structured.  Yet neither Title VII
nor the ADA require employers to make these accommodations for others.”) (footnotes omitted).
23 See 42 U.S.C. §§ 12112(b)(5)(A), 12111(9) (2000).
24 Id. § 12112(b)(5)(A) (emphasis added).
25 See Christine Jolls, Antidiscrimination and Accommodation, 115 HARV. L. REV. 642,
645 (2001) (“[I]n a broader respect than has generally been appreciated, some aspects of
antidiscrimination law — in particular its disparate impact branch — are in fact requirements of
accommodation.  In such instances it is hard to resist the conclusion that antidiscrimination and
accommodation are overlapping rather than fundamentally distinct categories, despite the
frequent claims of commentators to the contrary. . . . [E]ven those aspects of antidiscrimination
law that are not in fact accommodation requirements in the sense just described are similar to
accommodation requirements in respects that have not previously been understood.”).
26 See id. at 645, 686-87; see also Sharon Rabin-Margalioth, Anti-Discrimination,
Accommodation and Universal Mandates—Aren’t They All the Same?, 24 BERKELEY J. EMP. &
LAB. L. 111, 125-26 (2003) (“Title VII . . . bans employers from refusing to hire male candidates
for a flight attendant position, even when the employer contends that the policy is driven by
monetary considerations of aligning the profile of the flight attendant with customer preferences. 
Even where it is profitable, however, employers must refrain from engaging in sex
discrimination. . . . This duty to incur costs to avoid Title VII liability resembles the costs
employers incur accommodating certain groups under accommodation mandates.  In both cases,
employers must abandon the profit maximizing calculus in favor of inclusion of members of
protected groups.”) (footnote omitted).
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Title VII are fundamentally different because Title I imposes significant costs on employers,
while Title VII does not.  This argument emphasizes that Title I has a reasonable accommodation
provision that Title VII lacks.  That provision requires an employer to provide a disabled
employee or job applicant who cannot perform a job as it is currently structured with reasonable
accommodations that alter the job so that the disabled person can fill it,23 unless the employer
“can demonstrate that the accommodation would impose an undue hardship on the operation of
[its] business.”24  The traditionalists contend that this requirement places great costs on
employers, and that employers bear no equivalent burden under Title VII.  More recently, a group
of revisionists, led by Christine Jolls, has argued that the traditional view overstates the
differences between Title I and Title VII.25  The revisionists note that Title VII also imposes costs
on employers, including in the statute’s prohibition of intentional discrimination or “disparate
treatment.”  For instance, Title VII forces employers to adopt nondiscriminatory hiring practices
that may alienate prejudiced customers and coworkers who want to interact only with employees
who have particular demographic characteristics.26  Title VII also prohibits employers from
making employment decisions based on statistically accurate generalizations about a protected
27 See Jolls, supra note 25, at 645, 686-87; see also Samuel R. Bagenstos, “Rational
Discrimination,” Accommodation, and the Politics of (Disability) Civil Rights, 89 VA. L. REV.
825, 832 (2003) (“[A]ccommodation requirements represent nothing more than a specific
example of the general prohibition of rational discrimination—a prohibition that is well
entrenched in the law [including Title VII].”); Samuel R. Bagenstos, Subordination, Stigma, and
“Disability,” 86 VA. L. REV. 397, 457 (2000) [hereinafter Bagenstos, Subordination]
(“[D]iscrimination on the basis of the forbidden classifications is frequently rational for the
discriminator, but the civil rights laws [including Title VII] prohibit it anyway.”) (footnote
omitted); Mark Kelman, Market Discrimination and Groups, 53 STAN. L. REV. 833, 846 (2001)
(“Title VII sometimes permits cost-saving statistical discrimination and sometimes forbids it:
When it forbids it, I believe it is demanding accommodation.”).
In addition, Title VII prevents an employer from using a facially-neutral policy that has a
disparate impact on a protected class if the employer “fails to demonstrate that the challenged
practice is job related for the position in question and consistent with business necessity,” 42
U.S.C. § 2000e-2(k)(1)(A)(i) (2000), or if the plaintiff “show[s] that other selection devices
without a similar discriminatory effect would also serve the employer’s legitimate interest in
efficient and trustworthy workmanship,” Dothard v. Rawlinson, 433 U.S. 321, 329 (1977)
(citation and internal quotation marks omitted); Jolls, supra note 25, at 652-66.
28 See, e.g., Jolls, supra note 25, at 685-86 (“The point is the way in which prohibitions
on discrimination based upon customer or coworker attitudes or upon correct employer beliefs
about a particular group impose financial costs on employers, much as do accommodation
requirements.”); Karlan & Rutherglen, supra note 22, at 24 (“[A]n efficiency rationale . . . cannot
explain the ADA’s requirement of reasonable accommodation.  The signal from a genuine
disability is not wholly spurious. . . . An individual who is limited in a ‘major life activity’ might
well be limited in some aspect of a given job.  Less obviously, even if many disabled workers
would not be limited with respect to a particular job, employers still might incur higher costs to
accurately assess the productivity of the disabled than other applicants for employment.  Even
before the passage of the ADA, some employers found such expenditures to be profitable and
hired the disabled, but it hardly follows, after the enactment of the ADA, that all employers now
find such expenditures to be profitable.  If the innovations required by the ADA were generally
efficient, they would have been more widely adopted without its enactment.”) (footnote omitted).
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class.27
Both the traditional and the revisionist accounts of the differences between Title I and
Title VII focus, however, on the quantitative or monetary costs that each statute imposes on
employers.28  What both sides of this debate miss, and what the duty to mitigate issue helps
highlight, is that considering solely quantitative or monetary costs overlooks one of the most
important differences between Title I and Title VII: that Title I’s reasonable accommodation
provision and Title VII’s prohibition on intentional discrimination attribute different moral or
normative weight to the costs that they impose on employers.  Title VII’s disparate treatment
jurisprudence accords no moral or normative weight to the costs that an employer may incur from
hiring members of a protected class; it operates on the assumption that these costs give an
29 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(e)(1) (emphasis added).
30 See Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins, 490 U.S. 228, 242 (1989) (plurality opinion) (“Title
VII does identify one circumstance in which an employer may take gender into account in
making an employment decision, namely, when gender is a ‘bona fide occupational qualification
[(BFOQ)] reasonably necessary to the normal operation of th[e] particular business or enterprise.’ 
The only plausible inference to draw from this provision is that, in all other circumstances, a
person’s gender may not be considered in making decisions that affect her.”) (citation omitted).
31 Dothard v. Rawlinson, 433 U.S. 321, 334 (1977); see also UAW v. Johnson Controls,
Inc., 499 U.S. 187, 201 (1991) (“The BFOQ defense is written narrowly, and this Court has read
it narrowly.”).
32 Johnson Controls, Inc., 499 U.S. at 210.
33 Title I also prohibits intentional discrimination against a disabled job applicant or
employee who can perform the job in question as it is currently structured.  See 42 U.S.C. §
12112(a) (2000).  Like Title VII, Title I assumes that an employer has no legitimate cause to
complain about the costs of abandoning intentional discrimination.  See infra text accompanying
notes 168-175, 184.
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employer no legitimate cause for complaint.  Title VII recognizes no valid justification, including
cost, for employment decisions based on race or color.  The statute identifies one situation where
employers can legitimately make employment decisions based on religion, sex, or national origin,
namely, “those certain instances where religion, sex, or national origin is a bona fide
occupational qualification reasonably necessary to the normal operation of that particular
business or enterprise.”29  But as the Supreme Court has emphasized, this is a singular,30 and
“extremely narrow exception,”31 in which cost is not a valid reason for refusing to employ a
protected person.  “The extra cost of employing members of one sex,” for instance, is not
sufficient to defend sex-based hiring practices under Title VII.32  Title VII’s prohibition on
intentional discrimination may impose costs on employers, as the revisionists note, but the Title
VII jurisprudence assumes that this gives employers no rightful ground for complaint because
these costs reflect the moral and normative goals of the statute.
In contrast, Title I’s reasonable accommodation provision recognizes that employers can
have legitimate grounds to complain about the costs of accommodation, that these are costs that
employers can legitimately seek to minimize, and that efforts to minimize the costs of
accommodation are not merely a form of prejudice.33  This is an important difference, and it
suggests a powerful reason to impose a duty to mitigate on people asking for reasonable
accommodation under Title I.  One strong reason that people seeking the protection of Title I’s
reasonable accommodation provision should have a duty to mitigate is that employers can
legitimately expect employees and job applicants to minimize the difficulty and expense of the
accommodations that the employees and applicants require.  As the statute recognizes, employers
have a legitimate interest in reducing these costs.
34 See infra note 63.
35 I take as a starting point the fact that the ADA exists and is being enforced.  I do not
consider whether the ADA should have been enacted, whether the ADA should now be repealed,
or how the ADA would compare to a social insurance scheme.  For commentary discussing those
questions, see RICHARD A. EPSTEIN, FORBIDDEN GROUNDS: THE CASE AGAINST EMPLOYMENT
DISCRIMINATION LAWS 494 (1992) (“The ADA fares no better than other forms of
antidiscrimination laws, and perhaps worse.  It too should be repealed, whether or not some
subsidy for disabled persons is retained.”); Ruth Colker, The Death of Section 504, 35 U. MICH.
J.L. REFORM 219, 219 (2001/2002) (“The passage of the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA)
was a significant and positive development for the law of disability discrimination.”) (footnote
omitted); Jerry L. Mashaw, Against First Principles, 31 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 211, 231 (1994) (“I
agree, therefore, with Richard Epstein that the ADA is a deeply-flawed statute.  I do not,
however, agree that the remedy is repeal.  Or, to put the matter more precisely, I do not agree that
we should return to a regime in which our disability policy consists entirely of pensioning people
out of the work force and providing some extremely modest efforts at increasing the supply of
‘able’ workers through rehabilitation, vocational counseling, and the like.”).
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If the duty to mitigate issue helps cast light on the debate over the differences between
Title I and Title VII, a second debate in the Title I scholarship casts light back on the duty to
mitigate question.  This second debate revolves around whether Title I’s reasonable
accommodation provision has had negative employment effects on disabled people, meaning that
the costs that the reasonable accommodation provision imposes on employers have made the
employers less willing to hire disabled people than the employers were before Title I was
enacted.  There is at least some evidence to support the view that Title I’s reasonable
accommodation provision has had negative employment effects, although the issue remains
contested.34  If Title I’s reasonable accommodation provision has had negative employment
effects, then imposing a duty to mitigate on disabled people seeking reasonable accommodation,
which might seem to disadvantage disabled people, could actually help them by reducing the
costs that employing disabled people places on employers and thus increasing employers’
willingness to hire the disabled.  Imposing a duty to mitigate could also help disabled people,
even if Title I’s reasonable accommodation provision has not had negative employment effects. 
It may be the case, for instance, that the enactment of Title I has increased employers’
willingness to hire disabled people, because employers’ fears of being sued under the statute for
not hiring disabled people outweigh their reluctance to assume the costs of accommodation.  An
employer in this position would presumably be even more willing to hire disabled people if the
cost of accommodating them was reduced.
This Article aims to contribute then both to the resolution of a hard doctrinal problem and
to a deeper understanding of Title I and its place within the law of employment discrimination.35 
Part I argues that the Supreme Court (or, better yet, Congress) should find a duty to mitigate
under Title I of the ADA.  Part II explains why this obligation should take the specific form of a
duty of reasonable mitigation.  The duty of reasonable mitigation I propose would require Title I
plaintiffs to undertake those mitigating measures that could reduce their need for accommodation
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and that would be undertaken by a reasonable person in the same situation—meaning, at the
least, a reasonable person with the same condition, the same mitigating measures available, and
the same financial resources for treatment.  This duty would reject both of the extreme positions
that currently dominate the lower court opinions considering the duty to mitigate.  One set of
these opinions finds no duty to mitigate, while the other generally suggests that Title I plaintiffs
are obligated to mitigate whenever mitigation is possible.  In contrast, the duty of reasonable
mitigation that I advocate would be limited to mitigation that could reduce a plaintiff’s need for
accommodation because this is the mitigation that could serve an employer’s legitimate interest
in minimizing the expense and difficulty that can be associated with providing accommodation. 
If mitigation could not lessen a plaintiff’s need for accommodation, either because the plaintiff
already requires no accommodation or because the mitigation could not have a large enough
impact on the plaintiff’s disability, the duty of reasonable mitigation would not require the
plaintiff to mitigate.  The duty of reasonable mitigation would also be limited to mitigation that a
reasonable person in the same situation would undertake because plaintiffs can have legitimate
cause not to mitigate in some circumstances.  The duty of reasonable mitigation would obligate a
Title I plaintiff to assume only those risks and side effects that a reasonable person would assume
to eliminate or ameliorate the condition in question, to follow only those measures to improve
overall health that a reasonable person with the same condition would follow, and to shoulder
only those financial costs associated with mitigation that a reasonable person with the same
financial means would shoulder.  Courts should not find the standard of reasonable mitigation
too difficult to administer because judges and juries have significant experience with applying
similar standards of reasonable mitigation in many legal contexts, including cases about torts,
workers’ compensation, Social Security disability benefits, and private disability insurance
policies.
Requiring plaintiffs to undertake reasonable mitigation should resolve the vast bulk of
Title I cases raising the duty to mitigate issue.  I also contend, moreover, that the reasonable
mitigation standard can appropriately resolve two particularly hard categories of cases.  The first
involves disabled people who do not want to assume a serious risk or side effect associated with
mitigation that a reasonable person in the same situation would assume.  The second involves the
small number of disabled people who do not mitigate when a reasonable person would because
they understand their disability to be central to their cultural identity.  Both cases involve
disabled people who have made unreasonable decisions against mitigation in situations where
reasonable mitigation would involve particularly significant sacrifices, at least from the
perspective of the disabled person in question.  I conclude, however, that disabled people in these
difficult situations should still be subject to the duty of reasonable mitigation.  The same
arguments for imposing a duty to mitigate on other Title I plaintiffs apply here as well.  And
establishing a separate legal standard, outside of the reasonable mitigation standard, to govern
these hard cases would foster endless disputes about when each of the two standards should
apply.
Yet these difficult categories of cases illustrate that judges and juries should proceed
cautiously before concluding that a plaintiff’s decision against mitigation is unreasonable. 
Empirical data about the behavior of other disabled people in the plaintiff’s situation is an
important source of information that fact-finders can rely upon in making the judgment that a
11
plaintiff has acted unreasonably.  The more disabled people in the plaintiff’s situation who decide
to mitigate, the more evidence there is that mitigation is the only reasonable choice.  At the same
time, the fact that most people in a certain situation have mitigated should not always compel the
conclusion that the people who make the other decision are unreasonable.  In some situations, the
sacrifice associated with mitigation may be large enough, or the costs and benefits of mitigation
sufficiently matched, that decisions both for and against mitigation are reasonable, even if a
majority of people in the plaintiff’s situation choose to mitigate.  For this reason, courts should
not automatically and immediately equate reasonableness with majority rule.  It is worth the
effort for courts to evaluate the reasonableness of a plaintiff’s conduct carefully, considering to
the extent possible not only how many people in the plaintiff’s situation have mitigated or not,
but why they have acted as well.  A more cautious approach would help safeguard a plaintiff’s
most important legitimate interests, justifying its somewhat greater demands on the capacity of
fact-finders.
Part III briefly examines the legal rights of people who have mitigated in light of the duty
of reasonable mitigation that I advocate imposing.  It argues that the duty to mitigate should be
paired with greater protections for mitigators.  For obvious reasons, a person who remains
substantially limited in a major life activity even after reasonable mitigation is protected under
Title I and entitled to reasonable accommodations.  This person has taken reasonable efforts to
minimize his need for accommodation, but is still disabled and in potential need of
accommodation.  I argue, however, that a plaintiff should also be protected from intentional
discrimination (although not entitled to accommodation) as a “regarded as” disabled person
under Title I if he has no substantial limitations after mitigating, but suffers an adverse
employment action because he had to mitigate or because of the (non-substantially-limiting) side
effects of the mitigation.  Protecting these two classes of mitigators from intentional
discrimination would advance legitimate interests under Title I, without impinging upon the
legitimate interests of employers.
Part IV uses the duty to mitigate issue to illuminate a key difference between Title I and
Title VII.  It argues that Title VII should impose no duty to mitigate, despite the advantages of
placing such an obligation on people seeking the protection of Title I’s reasonable
accommodation provision.  Placing a duty to mitigate on Title VII plaintiffs—which the Title VII
jurisprudence formally does not do but arguably might be doing indirectly—would allow
employers to avoid costs that reflect the very bias the statute seeks to condemn.  But imposing a
duty to mitigate on plaintiffs seeking the protection of Title I’s accommodation provision would
serve what the statute recognizes as legitimate interests.
I. THE CASE FOR IMPOSING A DUTY TO MITIGATE ON PLAINTIFFS SEEKING THE PROTECTION
OF TITLE I’S REASONABLE ACCOMMODATION PROVISION
The first question to ask in thinking about the duty to mitigate issue under Title I is
whether Title I establishes such a duty.  If Title I’s statutory text answers that question, the status
of the duty to mitigate is settled.  If the text is unclear, one needs to look elsewhere for guidance. 
As we will see, the case for imposing a duty to mitigate on plaintiffs seeking the protection of
Title I’s reasonable accommodation provision focuses on policy considerations because the
36 42 U.S.C. § 12102(2).
37 Id. § 12111(8).
38 Id. § 12112(a).
39 Id. §§ 12112(b)(5)(A), 12111(9).
40 Id. § 12112(b)(5)(A).
41 See supra text accompanying notes 1-3.
42 See, e.g., Marion J. Franz et al., Nutrition Principles for the Management of Diabetes
and Related Complications, 17 DIABETES CARE 490, 491 (1994) (“For obese persons with type II
diabetes mellitus, moderate weight loss irrespective of starting weight has been shown to reduce
hyperglycemia, dyslipidemia, and hypertension.”); Jóhannes Kári Kristinsson, Diabetic
Retinopathy: Screening and Prevention of Blindness, 75 ACTA OPHTHALMOLOGICA
SCANDINAVICA 1, 9 (Supp. 1997) (“In recent years laser treatment has been introduced that can
significantly decrease the likelihood of blindness in diabetic patients, if the eyes are treated at the
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statutory text is indeterminate on the issue of mitigation.
The ADA defines “‘disability’” as “(A) a physical or mental impairment that substantially
limits one or more of the major life activities of [an] individual; (B) a record of such an
impairment; or (C) being regarded as having such an impairment.”36  Title I defines a “‘qualified
individual with a disability’” as “an individual with a disability who, with or without reasonable
accommodation, can perform the essential functions of the employment position.”37  Title I
prohibits intentional employment discrimination “against a qualified individual with a disability
because of the disability.”38  It also entitles a qualified disabled job applicant or employee to
“reasonable accommodations” that alter a job so that the disabled person can perform it,39 unless
the employer can establish that those accommodations “would impose an undue hardship” on the
employer.40
This statutory scheme simply does not indicate whether there is a duty to mitigate. 
Consider, for example, the job applicant described in the introduction who needs work
equipment for the visually impaired because his vision is severely limited, and he has refused an
operation that could allow him to see much more clearly.41  This applicant would certainly count
as disabled if he needed equipment for the visually impaired because his severely limited
eyesight could not be treated.  This applicant would certainly not count as disabled if he needed
equipment for the visually impaired because he had made an arbitrary decision to wear a
blindfold despite having fully functional vision.  In fact, however, this applicant cannot see
clearly by simply removing a blindfold, but he can do something to see clearly.  Title I’s text just
does not address whether he has an obligation to reduce or eliminate his disability if he can.  It is
similarly silent on the obligations of a plaintiff who could control her diabetes much more
effectively if she lost weight, exercised, modified her diet, and had surgery to combat the
deterioration of her vision,42 or a plaintiff who could control his manic depression much more
appropriate stage of the disease.”); Madelyn L. Wheeler, Nutrition Management and Physical
Activity as Treatments for Diabetes, 26 PRIMARY CARE 857, 857 (1999) (“Diabetes is essentially
a self-management disease.  For people with type 1 diabetes, nutrition and physical activity
recommendations are integrated with blood glucose monitoring and an insulin regimen.  For
people with type 2 diabetes, this means integrating blood glucose monitoring with
nonpharmacological therapy (nutrition management and physical activity).  If necessary,
pharmacologic therapy (oral agents or insulin) enters into the equation also.”); Shelby R. Wilkes,
Current Therapy of Diabetic Retinopathy: Laser and Vitreoretinal Surgery, 85 J. NAT’L MED.
ASS’N 841, 846 (1993) (“The advent of laser surgery and pars plana vitreous surgery has
enhanced the vision and improved the lifestyle of the diabetic patient.”); supra text
accompanying note 11.
43 See, e.g., Margaret M. Rea et al., Family-Focused Treatment Versus Individual
Treatment for Bipolar Disorder: Results of a Randomized Clinical Trial, 71 J. CONSULTING &
CLINICAL PSYCHOL. 482, 482 (2003) (“Results suggest that family psychoeducational treatment
is a useful adjunct to pharmacotherapy in decreasing the risk of relapse and hospitalization
frequently associated with bipolar disorder.”); infra text accompanying notes 78-85.
44 527 U.S. 471 (1999).
45 See Albertson’s, Inc. v. Kirkingburg, 527 U.S. 555 (1999); Murphy v. United Parcel
Serv., Inc., 527 U.S. 516 (1999).
46 See Sutton, 527 U.S. at 475.
47 See id. at 475-76.
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effectively if he took lithium and underwent psychological counseling.43
Faced with this textual indeterminacy, some of the few lower courts and commentators to
consider whether Title I imposes a duty to mitigate have attempted to resolve the issue by
extrapolating from an argument about the ADA’s text that appeared in a Supreme Court opinion,
Sutton v. United Air Lines, Inc.,44 on another issue.  But this effort is unconvincing.
Sutton and two companion cases decided in 1999 considered the status of Title I plaintiffs
who have mitigated their disabilities.45  The duty to mitigate was not at issue in Sutton, and none
of the Sutton opinions addressed it, because the Sutton plaintiffs had already mitigated.  These
plaintiffs had severe myopia, but they wore corrective lenses that allowed them to see 20/20 or
better.46  They sued United Airlines under Title I after the airline refused to hire them as
commercial airline pilots because they could not satisfy the airline’s requirement that its pilots
have uncorrected vision of 20/100 or better.47  The Sutton case raised the question of whether the
plaintiffs counted as disabled or “regarded as” disabled people now that they had mitigated.  The
Court held that if a plaintiff is no longer substantially limited in any major life activity after
48 See id. at 475, 482, 488; Albertson’s, 527 U.S. at 565-66; Murphy, 527 U.S. at 521. 
Sutton holds that an individual does count as a disabled person under Title I “if, notwithstanding
the use of a corrective device, th[e] individual is substantially limited in a major life activity.” 
Sutton, 527 U.S. at 488.
49 See Sutton, 527 U.S. at 489; Murphy, 527 U.S. at 521-22.
50 See Sutton, 527 U.S. at 488-93.
51 Id. at 482.
52 See id. at 482-83.
53 See Nawrot v. CPC Int’l, 277 F.3d 896, 904 (7th Cir. 2002) (“[I]n applying the statute
to specific impairments, courts may consider only the limitations of an individual that persist
after taking into account mitigation measures . . . . This is not, however, license for courts to
meander in ‘would, could, or should-have’ land.  We consider only the measures actually taken
and consequences that actually follow.  Cf. Sutton, 527 U.S. at 482-84 . . . . Those who
discriminate take their victims as they find them.”); Williams v. Thresholds, Inc., No. 02 C 9101,
slip op. at 9-10 (N.D. Ill. Sept. 22, 2003) (“Threshold argues that because Williams could have
taken prednisone, and that in fact when he later took prednisone he felt much better, he was not
disabled for ADA purposes.  This misconstrues Sutton.  The Sutton court explicitly stated that
courts should not engage in counter-factual hypothesizing, guessing whether a course of
treatment would have alleviated a plaintiff’s disability.”) (citation omitted); Bertinetti v. Joy
Mining Mach., 231 F. Supp. 2d 828, 833-34 (S.D. Ill. 2002) (“[T]he defendant urges the Court to
consider that Bertinetti’s condition might have been improved if he had utilized additional
corrective devices.  Sutton, however, does not give courts a license to ‘meander in ‘would, could,
or should-have’ land.’  Courts should only consider mitigating steps actually taken and the
consequences that actually followed.  Accordingly, this court will not speculate about what
Bertinetti’s condition would be if he had taken additional steps to improve his condition.”)
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mitigating, she does not count as a disabled person for purposes of Title I.48  Sutton also held that
a plaintiff is not protected under Title I as someone who is “regarded as” disabled unless she can
demonstrate that the employer-defendant acted because it thought that the plaintiff had an
impairment that substantially limited a major life activity.49  On this holding, the Sutton plaintiffs
were not protected under Title I because their sight was not substantially limited with the
corrective lenses that they wore in place and because there was insufficient evidence that United
Airlines thought that the plaintiffs were substantially limited.50
One argument that the Sutton Court made in reaching its conclusions contended that the
use of the present tense in the ADA’s definition of disability, where “the phrase ‘substantially
limits’ appears in the Act in the present indicative verb form,”51 helped establish that a plaintiff
who has mitigated should be evaluated in her current, mitigated state for purposes of determining
whether she is a disabled person covered under Title I.52  Some lower courts53 and
(citations omitted); Capizzi v. County of Placer, 135 F. Supp. 2d 1105, 1113 (E.D. Cal. 2001)
(“The conclusion that a failure to mitigate does not defeat the cause of action is supported by
Sutton.  There the Court observed that in the ADA ‘the phrase ‘substantially limits’ appears . . .
in the present indicative verb form, . . . [indicating that] the language is properly read as requiring
that a person be presently—not potentially or hypothetically—substantially limited in order to
demonstrate a disability.’  It should follow from the fact that the question of disability addresses
plaintiff’s current condition, that the fact that a particular procedure would mitigate the condition
cannot prevent a finding that the plaintiff is presently disabled, though it might effect the
damages awarded upon a finding of liability.”) (citation omitted); Finical v. Collections
Unlimited, Inc., 65 F. Supp. 2d 1032, 1037-38 (D. Ariz. 1999) (“Defendant asserts that, when
mitigating measures are considered, Plaintiff does not have a disability as defined by the
ADA. . . . This argument fails because the Supreme Court requires a case-by-case analysis of the
limitations an individual faces in his or her current state.”).
54 See Debra Burke & Malcolm Abel, Ameliorating Medication and ADA Protection: Use
It and Lose It or Refuse It and Lose It?, 38 AM. BUS. L.J. 785, 811 (2001) (“[T]he Supreme
Court concluded in Sutton that the present indicative verb tense used by Congress required an
individualized inquiry into the actual, not hypothetical, situation of the plaintiff’s condition with
respect to the issue of an impairment substantially limiting a major life activity.  Considering
how a plaintiff would fare if he or she employed mitigating measures requires speculation and
the consideration of a hypothetical situation, an approach seemingly rejected by the Court in
Sutton.”) (footnote omitted); Joshua C. Dickinson, Will the Supreme Court Allow Employers to
Consider Reasonable Mitigating Measures Not Presently Utilized by Employees When
Determining Whether a “Disability” Exists Under Section A of the ADA?, 68 UMKC L. REV.
389, 398-99 (2000) (“One thing seems evident from the trilogy of cases . . . ; it is the actual
condition that the employee presents herself in at the time of consideration which is pertinent to
the disability inquiry. . . . [T]he Court placed great emphasis on evaluating the individual in their
present state and not some potential or hypothetical state.”); Stephanie A. Fishman, Note,
Individuals with Disabilities but Without Mitigating Measures, 46 WAYNE L. REV. 2013, 2033
(2000) (“According to Sutton, a plaintiff is not to be viewed hypothetically but in her present
state, with or without mitigating measures, to determine whether an impairment is in fact
substantially limiting.  Following the literal reasoning in Sutton, however, a plaintiff suffering
from an impairment such as myopia, who did not utilize any corrective devices at the time of the
alleged discrimination, would also be disabled under the ADA because she is currently
substantially limited in the major life activity of seeing.”) (footnotes omitted); Sarah Shaw,
Comment, Why Courts Cannot Deny ADA Protection to Plaintiffs Who Do Not Use Available
Mitigating Measures for Their Impairments, 90 CAL. L. REV. 1981, 2007 (2002) (“[T]he same
reasoning that supported the Court’s conclusion that mitigating measures must be considered
when an individual is currently using such measures demands the opposite conclusion with
regard to an individual who is not presently using mitigating measures.  As emphasized by the
Court, the plain language of the statute indicates that an individual’s impairment should be
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commentators54 have extrapolated from this part of Sutton to assert that Title I imposes no duty to
evaluated in its present state rather than in a hypothetical state where it ‘might, could, or would’
be substantially limiting.”) (footnote omitted); Christine M. Tomko, Note, The Economically
Disadvantaged and the ADA: Why Economic Need Should Factor into the Mitigating Measures
Disability Analysis, 52 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 1033, 1043 (2002) (“Furthermore, in explaining its
decision, the Court stated that ‘a person must be presently—not potentially or
hypothetically—substantially limited in order to demonstrate a disability.  A disability exists only
where an impairment substantially limits, not where it ‘might,’ ‘could,’ or ‘would’ be
substantially limiting if mitigating measures were not taken.’  By extension, disability must also
exist where the impairment substantially limits the plaintiff because he cannot afford to take
mitigating measures, not where the impairment ‘might not,’ ‘could not,’ or ‘would not’ be
substantially limiting if mitigating measures could be taken.”) (footnote omitted); see also
Bagenstos, Subordination, supra note 27, at 496 (“The Court’s conclusion seems entirely sound,
both as a matter of basic statutory interpretation and as a means of implementing an
antisubordination principle.  Showing off its facility with grammatical categories, the Sutton
Court noted one crucial textual point: ‘[T]he phrase ‘substantially limits’ appears in the Act in
the present indicative verb form.’”).
55 See infra text accompanying notes 169-170.
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mitigate because the use of the present tense in the ADA’s definition of disability establishes that
Title I plaintiffs are to be evaluated based on their current abilities and limitations, whether they
have mitigated or not.  There are a number of reasons to reject this contention, however.
First, even if one wanted to use the present tense in the ADA’s definition of disability to
resolve the duty to mitigate issue, one could not.  Suppose that the use of the present tense in the
definition of disability conclusively establishes that Title I plaintiffs are to be evaluated in their
present state.  That still would not establish how courts are to determine a plaintiff’s present
state.  What is the present condition of a person who has not mitigated but could?  Is he simply
someone who is disabled?  Or is he best described as someone who is presently not pursuing
reasonable efforts to lessen or eliminate his disability?
Second, the text suggests no reason to think that one should use the present tense in the
ADA’s definition of disability to resolve the duty to mitigate issue.  There is no indication in the
statute that the issue of mitigation should be decided by examining the definition of disability.  It
is also hard to characterize Congress as making an important choice in its decision to use the
present tense in defining disability because it is impossible to imagine Congress using any tense
but the present there.  Congress could not have defined disability in the future tense of “will
substantially limit” because that definition would have necessarily relied on speculation and
frequently focused on irrelevant information.  A definition of disability that used the past tense of
“substantially limited” would have similarly missed vital information, because a plaintiff’s
present state is always relevant, regardless of whether there is a duty to mitigate.  Consider, for
instance, two plaintiffs who have both mitigated, but one still has substantial limitations and the
other does not.  Clearly, that present difference is relevant in determining each plaintiff’s rights
now that each has mitigated.  The first plaintiff, for example, has a much better claim to
reasonable accommodations because he still has substantial limitations.55
56 Of course, establishing that one is covered under Title I is not the same as proving that
a particular defendant has violated the statute.  Even if the Sutton plaintiffs had established their
right to demand a reasonable accommodation, United Airlines would not have had to provide the
accommodation if it could “demonstrate that the accommodation would impose an undue
hardship on the operation of [its] business.”  42 U.S.C. § 12112(b)(5)(A) (2000).  United Airlines
might have been able to defend its uncorrected vision requirement for commercial airline pilots
under this standard.  See infra text accompanying note 171.
57 See, e.g., Clinton v. City of New York, 524 U.S. 417, 429 (1998) (“Acceptance of the
Government’s new-found reading of § 692 ‘would produce an absurd and unjust result which
Congress could not have intended.’”) (citation omitted); United States v. X-Citement Video, Inc.,
513 U.S. 64, 69 (1994) (“Some applications of respondents’ position would produce results that
were not merely odd, but positively absurd. . . . We do not assume that Congress, in passing laws,
intended such results.”); Pub. Citizen v. United States Dep’t of Justice, 491 U.S. 440, 454 (1989)
(“Where the literal reading of a statutory term would ‘compel an odd result,’ we must search for
other evidence of congressional intent to lend the term its proper scope.”) (citation omitted);
Green v. Bock Laundry Mach. Co., 490 U.S. 504, 509-11 (1989) (“The Rule’s plain language
commands weighing of prejudice to a defendant in a civil trial as well as in a criminal trial.  But
that literal reading would compel an odd result in a case like this. . . . No matter how plain the
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In addition, the interpretation of the ADA’s definition of disability that some lower courts
and commentators have adopted would lead to absurd results if applied to the duty to mitigate
issue.  Imagine, as these courts and commentators would, that the use of the present tense in the
ADA’s definition of disability establishes that plaintiffs who have mitigated are to be evaluated
in their mitigated state, and also establishes that plaintiffs who have not mitigated are to be
evaluated based on their current abilities and limitations without bearing any duty to mitigate. 
On this reading of the statute, Title I would treat some disabled people more favorably because
they have not mitigated and would accordingly give some disabled people an incentive not to
mitigate their disabilities when they otherwise would.  Let’s return to the Sutton plaintiffs, for
example.  On the reading of Title I that some lower courts and commentators have adopted, the
Sutton plaintiffs should have rationally opted to discard their corrective lenses before applying to
United Airlines.  Discarding their lenses would have meant that courts would have been required
to evaluate the Sutton plaintiffs in their unmitigated condition, and to grant the plaintiffs Title I
protection because their unmitigated eyesight is substantially limited.  Coverage under Title I, in
turn, would have given the Sutton plaintiffs the right, if they were otherwise qualified for the
pilot positions they sought, to demand reasonable accommodations from United Airlines,
accommodations that might have been the same corrective lenses that the Court deemed to have
mitigated the plaintiffs’ disability.56  The interpretation of the ADA’s definition of disability that
some lower courts and commentators have extrapolated from Sutton would create the absurd
situation where a plaintiff can be better off demanding mitigation as an ADA remedy from an
employer rather than mitigating herself.  Elsewhere, the Supreme Court has repeatedly refused to
interpret statutory texts literally, even when the texts were clear, if literalism would produce
absurd results.57  In this case, the argument for embracing an absurd result is far weaker because
text of the Rule may be, we cannot accept an interpretation that would deny a civil plaintiff the
same right to impeach an adversary’s testimony that it grants to a civil defendant. . . . It is
unfathomable why a civil plaintiff — but not a civil defendant — should be subjected to this risk. 
Thus we agree with the Seventh Circuit that as far as civil trials are concerned, Rule 609(a)(1)
‘can’t mean what it says.’”) (citation omitted).
58 42 U.S.C. § 12111(10)(A).
59 Id. § 12111(10)(B).
60 Id. § 12111(9).
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the text on which the lower courts and commentators have relied is not clear.
With Title I’s statutory text indeterminate on the issue of mitigation, the case for
imposing a duty to mitigate turns on policy considerations.  The strongest argument for placing a
duty to mitigate on plaintiffs seeking the protection of Title I’s reasonable accommodation
provision is that employers can legitimately expect employees and job applicants to attempt to
lessen or eliminate their need for accommodation if doing so is both possible and (as elaborated
in Part II) reasonable.  Phrased another way, plaintiffs should not be entitled to accommodation
under Title I if they have refused to avail themselves of reasonable treatment options.  As Title I
recognizes, employers have a legitimate interest in minimizing the “significant difficulty or
expense” that can be associated with providing accommodations.58  In indicating how a court is
to assess whether an accommodation would impose an undue hardship on an employer, the
statute specifically states that a court should consider the “cost of the accommodation needed,”
“the effect on expenses and resources,” and “the impact . . . of such accommodation upon the
operation of the facility.”59
In fact, there are many reasons to believe that it is legitimate to seek to minimize the costs
of the accommodations that employers provide under Title I, and that employers’ concerns about
these costs cannot be dismissed as a form of bias.  Title I contemplates accommodations ranging
from “making existing facilities used by employees readily accessible to and usable by
individuals with disabilities” to “job restructuring, part-time or modified work schedules,
reassignment to a vacant position, acquisition or modification of equipment or devices,
appropriate adjustment or modifications of examinations, training materials or policies, the
provision of qualified readers or interpreters, and other similar accommodations.”60  Providing
these sorts of accommodations clearly imposes substantial and quantifiable costs on employers in
some cases, even if debate necessarily persists over the exact magnitude of the imposed costs
because systematic and representative data is unavailable.  The President’s Committee on
Employment of People with Disabilities, for instance, surveyed a sample of the employers who
contacted its Job Accommodation Network seeking information about accommodations between
July 1994 and June 1995.  This survey found that 10% of the 448 reported accommodations cost
between $501 and $1000, 4% of the accommodations cost between $1001 and $1500, 4% of the
accommodations cost between $1501 and $2000, 9% of the accommodations cost between $2001
61 See President’s Committee on Employment of People with Disabilities, Report to
Congress on the Job Accommodation Network 1, 3, 7 (July 26, 1996) (unpublished manuscript,
on file with author).
62 See PETER DAVID BLANCK, COMMUNICATING THE AMERICANS WITH DISABILITIES ACT:
TRANSCENDING COMPLIANCE: 1996 FOLLOW-UP REPORT ON SEARS, ROEBUCK AND CO. 17 fig.1,
21 (1996).
63 See supra text accompanying note 34.  For arguments that Title I’s reasonable
accommodation provision has had negative employment effects, see Daron Acemoglu & Joshua
D. Angrist, Consequences of Employment Protection?: The Case of the Americans with
Disabilities Act, 109 J. POL. ECON. 915, 916-17 (2001) (“The empirical analysis looks at the
employment and wages of disabled and nondisabled workers using data from the March Current
Population Survey (CPS) for 1988-97. . . . The CPS data show a post-ADA decline in the relative
employment of disabled men and women aged 21-39, with no change in relative wages.  The
deterioration in the relative employment position of disabled workers began in 1993 for men and
in 1992 for women, the first two years the ADA was in effect.  The results are unchanged by
controlling for pre-ADA trends in employment of the disabled or for the increase in the fraction
of people receiving disability insurance and supplemental security income (SSI).  Together these
findings lead us to conclude that the ADA reduced employment for disabled workers aged 21-
39.”); Thomas DeLeire, The Wage and Employment Effects of the Americans with Disabilities
Act, 35 J. HUM. RESOURCES 693, 711 (2000) (“A main goal of the ADA is to increase labor
market opportunities for people with disabilities through its mandate for employer-provided job
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and $5000, and 4% of the accommodations cost more than $5000.61  A study of Sears, Roebuck
from January 1993 to December 1995 found that 10% of the 71 accommodations the company
provided had direct costs of between $100 and $499, and 1% of the accommodations had direct
costs of between $500 and $1000.62
The costs that Title I’s reasonable accommodation provision imposes on employers may
also be distributed unevenly between employers.  Title I does not operate like a tax system, in
which each employer shares the social cost of helping the disabled by paying according to a
rubric applied to many employers.  If more disabled job applicants choose to apply to one
employer, that employer may ultimately bear more accommodation costs than an otherwise
identical competitor.
The duty of reasonable mitigation would mean that before an employer has to
accommodate someone—to make changes and to bear costs—that person has to mitigate his
disability—to make changes and to bear costs—to the extent that this is possible and reasonable. 
With this duty in place, employers would have to accommodate only those disabled people who
either cannot change in ways that could lessen their need for accommodations or have a good
reason not to change.
The debate about the possible negative employment effects associated with Title I’s
reasonable accommodation provision suggests, moreover, that disabled people could also
importantly benefit from a measure that lessened the cost of accommodation.63  Reducing the
accommodation and its antidiscrimination measures.  Although the ADA may have increased job
accommodation for and reduced discrimination against people with disabilities, the costs of
complying with the act were large enough to reduce the demand for disabled workers and undo
its intended effects.  This paper shows that the enactment of the ADA led to a decrease of 7.2
percentage points in their relative employment.  Moreover, these relative employment declines
began as early as 1990, the year of enactment, and continued to fall through 1995.”); id. (“These
results strongly suggest that the employment mandates of the ADA that require firms to provide
job accommodation to all of their disabled workers were an ineffective way to increase labor
market opportunities for people with disabilities.  In particular, the results suggest that these
mandates made it more costly for firms to employ people with disabilities, and, consequently,
their employment fell.”); Christine Jolls & J.J. Prescott, The Effects of “Reasonable
Accommodations” Requirements and Firing Costs on the Employment of Individuals with
Disabilities 3-4 (2003) (unpublished manuscript, on file with author) (“We estimate that the
ADA produced about a 10% decline in disabled employment in states in which its reasonable
accommodations requirement was an innovation, compared to states in which a similar
requirement existed at the state level prior to the ADA’s enactment.  This estimated effect of the
imposition of the ADA’s reasonable accommodations requirement is robust across a variety of
specifications and state samples.  By contrast, we find little effect of the ADA on disabled
employment in states in which the ADA’s traditional antidiscrimination prohibition, with its
associated firing costs, was an innovation, compared to states with similar preexisting
prohibitions.  Our results therefore suggest that the reasonable accommodations requirement of
the ADA, rather than its imposition of firing costs, was the primary source of the law’s effect on
disabled employment.”).  For criticism of the contention that Title I’s reasonable accommodation
provision has had negative employment effects, see Peter Blanck et al., Calibrating the Impact of
the ADA’s Employment Provisions, 14 STAN. L. & POL’Y REV. 267, 289 (2003) (“[E]xisting
research provides little basis on which policymakers can make informed decisions regarding how
the ADA has impacted ADA-qualified individuals.”); Douglas Kruse & Lisa Schur, Employment
of People with Disabilities Following the ADA, 42 INDUS. REL. 31, 31 (2003) (“Studies finding a
negative effect of the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA) on the employment of people with
disabilities have used the work disability measure, which has several potential problems in
measuring employment trends.  Using Survey of Income and Program Participation (SIPP) data
that permit alternative measures of disability, this study finds decreased employment among
those reporting work disabilities in the first few years after the ADA was passed but increased
employment when using a more probably appropriate measure of ADA coverage (functional and
activity limitations that do not prevent work).”); Susan Schwochau & Peter David Blanck, The
Economics of the Americans with Disabilities Act, Part III: Does the ADA Disable the
Disabled?, 21 BERKELEY J. EMP. & LAB. L. 271, 303 (2000) (“[A]ttribution of disemployment
results to the ADA is premature.”).
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cost of providing accommodation could increase employers’ willingness to hire disabled people. 
And augmenting employers’ willingness to hire disabled people is probably a surer route to
employment for more disabled people than relying on litigation against recalcitrant employers,
especially given the mounting evidence that only a very small percentage of Title I suits result in
64 See Ruth Colker, The Americans with Disabilities Act: A Windfall for Defendants, 34
HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 99, 100 (1999) (“[D]efendants prevail in more than ninety-three percent
of reported ADA employment discrimination cases decided on the merits at the trial court level. 
Of those cases that are appealed, defendants prevail in eighty-four percent of reported cases. 
These results are worse than results found in comparable areas of the law; only prisoner rights
cases fare as poorly.”) (footnotes omitted); Study Finds Employers Win Most ADA Title I Judicial
and Administrative Complaints, 22 MENTAL & PHYSICAL DISABILITY L. REP. 403, 403 (1998)
(“The American Bar Association’s (ABA’s) Commission on Mental and Physical Disability Law
. . . . decided to analyze all the ADA employment cases covered in the Reporter to determine the
exact percentages of employer and employee victories in such cases.  The primary result . . .
revealed that employers prevailed in approximately 92 percent of the final case
decisions–meaning cases that have gone through the appeals process or have not been overturned
on appeal as of March 31, 1998–thus contradicting the public perception that employers were
more heavily burdened by ADA Title I.  This 92 percent figure is consistent with the results of an
analysis of the EEOC’s statistics for administrative complaints, which reveals that employers
prevail in 86 percent of the administrative complaints resolved by the EEOC.”).
65 See supra note 53 and accompanying text.
66 Hooper v. Saint Rose Parish, 205 F. Supp. 2d 926, 929 (N.D. Ill. 2002).
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favorable judgments for the plaintiffs.64
Title I’s statutory text may be indeterminate on the issue of mitigation, but there are good
reasons to impose such a duty.  Part II considers the form that the duty to mitigate under Title I
should take.
II. THE DUTY OF REASONABLE MITIGATION
Establishing that there should be a duty to mitigate under Title I does not settle the
equally important questions about when that duty should apply, what standard courts should use
to enforce the duty, and what evidence should be relevant.  Let us turn now to the practical,
doctrinal issue of how Title I’s duty to mitigate should be structured.
The small number of lower court opinions to consider the duty to mitigate under Title I
are divided on the question of whether the duty should exist and have advanced no systematic
way of thinking about when the duty should apply.  The opinions that reject the duty to mitigate
rely on the (unconvincing) argument about the present tense in the ADA’s definition of
disability.65  The lower court opinions that endorse a duty to mitigate, in turn, have not
established any clear rubric for implementing it.  To the extent that these decisions imply any
standard for when the duty to mitigate should apply, most appear to suggest that Title I plaintiffs
are under a duty to mitigate whenever mitigation is possible.  One recent United States District
Court opinion, for instance, states that “[w]here a person’s impairment can be treated and
symptoms alleviated by mitigating factors such as medication or treatments, such medications or
treatments must be taken into account in determining disability.”66  “The Court cannot permit
67 Id.
68 Tangires v. Johns Hopkins Hosp., 79 F. Supp. 2d 587, 596 (D. Md. 2000), aff’d, 230
F.3d 1354 (4th Cir. 2000) (mem.).
69 Hewitt v. Alcan Aluminum Corp., 185 F. Supp. 2d 183, 189 (N.D.N.Y. 2001); see also
Hill v. Kan. City Area Transp. Auth., 181 F.3d 891, 894 (8th Cir. 1999) (“Hill further argues that
the drowsiness caused by taking hypertension medication in combination with the pain relievers
prescribed for her work-related injuries was an ADA disability. . . . [W]e find no evidence in the
record that Hill’s physical condition compelled her to take a combination of medications that
persistently affected her ability in 1995 to stay awake on the job.  Therefore, she failed to present
sufficient evidence that this alleged physical impairment substantially limited her major life
activity of working.”); Johnson v. Maynard, No. 01 Civ 7393(AKH), slip op. at __ (S.D.N.Y.
Feb. 25, 2003) (“Since plaintiff had medication available to her, and knew that she could
function normally if she took it, she cannot be said to have been substantially impaired if she
neglected to avail herself of such corrective measures. . . . Plaintiff’s failure to take advantage of
mitigating measures does not make her a qualified individual under the ADA.”); Mont-Ros v.
City of West Miami, 111 F. Supp. 2d 1338, 1356-57 (S.D. Fla. 2000) (“[B]ecause Plaintiff’s
sleep apnea condition is treatable and can be corrected with the use of a CPAP machine at night,
Plaintiff cannot demonstrate that he is ‘substantially limited in a major life activity.’”); Spradley
v. Custom Campers, Inc., 68 F. Supp. 2d 1225, 1232-33 (D. Kan. 1999) (“[P]laintiff has
conceded that on both occasions when he had seizures at work, he was not taking Dilantin, which
was prescribed to reduce the chance of a seizure.  The Supreme Court has recently held that if a
disorder can be controlled by medication or other corrective measures, it does not substantially
limit a major life activity.  Although the facts indicate that taking Dilantin will not necessarily
eliminate seizures, it would make it far less likely that he would have seizures.  Plaintiff does not
address this issue.”) (citation omitted); Roberts v. County of Fairfax, Virginia, 937 F. Supp. 541,
548 (E.D. Va. 1996) (“Dr. Wittenburg found in April 1993 that, with treatment, Roberts’
depression should not affect his work performance.  And it is undisputed that several of Roberts’
supervisors urged him to seek treatment, which he refused to do for a period of more than
fourteen months. . . . Roberts’ refusal to seek the recommended and available treatment precludes
him from being a ‘qualified individual with a disability’ under the ADA.”).
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[the plaintiff] to create a physical disability by failing to pursue treatment options.”67  A second
district court opinion holds that a plaintiff is not protected under Title I because her “asthma is
correctable by medication,” and she has not corrected it.68  A third declares that “[a] plaintiff who
does not avail himself of corrective medication is not a qualified individual under the ADA.”69  A
few other decisions seem to understand the duty to mitigate in more limited terms, but none
articulates a standard for when that duty should apply.  For example, one district court opinion
notes in denying a plaintiff Title I protection that the plaintiff has failed to take “a reasonable
measure” to mitigate.  The opinion, however, does not explore or explain the suggestion that the
70 Rose v. Home Depot U.S.A., Inc., 186 F. Supp. 2d 595, 614, 617 (D. Md. 2002).
71 Llante v. Am. NTN Bearing Mfg. Corp., No. 99 C 3091, slip op. at 12 (N.D. Ill. Nov.
15, 1999).
23
duty to mitigate might require plaintiffs to pursue only reasonable forms of mitigation.70 
Similarly, another district court opinion suggests that the relevant question might be whether the
plaintiff’s “alleged disability was easily correctable,” without elaborating on the suggestion or
indicating what the “easily” standard might mean.71
Part II’s core proposal is that plaintiffs seeking Title I protection should bear a duty of
reasonable mitigation, a duty to undertake those mitigating measures that could reduce their need
for workplace accommodation and that would be undertaken by a reasonable person in the same
situation—meaning, at the least, a reasonable person with the same impairment, the same
mitigating measures available, and the same financial resources for mitigation.  The justification
for excluding measures that could not lessen the plaintiff’s accommodation requirements from
the duty to mitigate should be clear from the previous discussion.  A crucial reason to impose a
duty to mitigate is to ease the burden that providing accommodations can place on employers. 
Mitigation cannot serve that function if it cannot diminish a plaintiff’s need for
accommodation—either because the plaintiff already requires no accommodation or because the
mitigation cannot have a large enough impact on the plaintiff’s disability.
Section A explains why the duty to mitigate should be a duty of reasonable mitigation,
outlining the strengths of this core proposal and describing how it would work with reference to
the three major categories of reasons why disabled people do not mitigate.  This section argues
that disabled people can have legitimate grounds for not mitigating in some circumstances, so
that it would be inappropriate to require Title I plaintiffs to mitigate whenever mitigation could
reduce their need for accommodation.  It also contends that the reasonable mitigation standard
has important advantages over a number of other possible standards for when the duty to mitigate
should apply, like a standard requiring mitigation whenever mitigation is not too risky for the
plaintiff, or a standard requiring mitigation that is not overly difficult for the plaintiff, or a
standard requiring mitigation that is financially affordable for the plaintiff, or a standard
requiring mitigation that costs less than what the defendant would bear in accommodating the
plaintiff.  A reasonable mitigation standard is more universal than a standard that only considers
risk or difficulty or expense, and courts can employ the reasonable mitigation standard to
evaluate the many different reasons why a plaintiff might not mitigate.  A duty of reasonable
mitigation also advances the ADA’s explicit commitment to combating disabled people’s
isolation and segregation.  Courts should have relatively little difficulty administering the duty of
reasonable mitigation because judges and juries already have substantial experience in applying
similar reasonable mitigation requirements to many legal settings, including cases about torts,
workers’ compensation, Social Security disability benefits, and private disability insurance
policies.
Imposing a duty of reasonable mitigation should resolve the vast bulk of Title I cases that
raise the duty to mitigate issue.  I contend, moreover, that the reasonableness standard provides
an appropriate way of handling two particularly hard categories of cases.  The first involves
72 See, e.g., Michael F. Dorman, An Overview of Cochlear Implants, in COCHLEAR
IMPLANTS: A HANDBOOK 5, 5-6 (Bonnie Poitras Tucker ed., 1998).
73 See, e.g., Noel L. Cohen & Ronald A. Hoffman, Complications of Cochlear Implant
Surgery in Adults and Children, 100 ANNALS OTOLOGY, RHINOLOGY & LARYNGOLOGY 708, 708
(1991) (“Surgery for cochlear prosthesis insertion exposes the patient to several potential
risks. . . . Major complications usually have to do with surgical technique and include flap
necrosis, improper electrode placement, and rare facial nerve problems.  Minor complications
include dehiscence of incisions, infection, facial nerve stimulation, dizziness, and pedestal
problems with the Ineraid device.”); id. at 711 (“Although life-threatening complications are
extremely rare, the devastating effects of major flap breakdown, facial palsy, or incorrect
electrode placement cannot be underestimated.  Major flap breakdown leads to device
contamination and the need for intravenous antibiotics and/or surgical revision.  Multiple
operations are sometimes required.  The trauma of facial paralysis is well known to all
otolaryngologists.  Faulty electrode placement results in lack of auditory response, a particularly
devastating outcome for a patient anticipating hearing restoration.  Patients suffer physically,
financially, and psychologically.”); Robert C. Wang et al., Cochlear Implant Flap
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plaintiffs who do not want to assume risks or side effects that a reasonable person would assume,
but that are serious nonetheless.  The second involves the small number of disabled people,
mostly deaf, who do not want to mitigate their disabilities even if a reasonable person would
because they believe that these disabilities are central to their cultural identity.  These two cases
are discussed separately in section B.
A. Core Cases
The reasonable mitigation standard provides an appropriate and administrable way of
dealing with the three major reasons why disabled people do not mitigate: the risks or side effects
associated with mitigation, the difficulties of maintaining high levels of overall health, and the
financial costs associated with mitigation.  This section will first discuss why it would be
inappropriate to demand that all disabled people who are not mitigating for one of these three
reasons mitigate as a condition of Title I protection.  It will then explore the benefits of applying
a standard of reasonable mitigation to these situations, as opposed to a number of other possible
standards, and explain how the reasonableness standard would work.
Consider why Title I should not deny protection to all of the plaintiffs who are not
mitigating because of risks or side effects associated with mitigation.  The risks and side effects
that can come with mitigation range widely in seriousness and appear in two main varieties, each
of which dissuades some disabled people from mitigating.  First, there is the risk that the
mitigation will not work, and that attempting the mitigation will cost the person time, suffering,
money, or worsened health and functioning.  In cochlear implant surgery, for instance, a surgeon
implants a device in the inner ear of a deaf person that is meant to enable the person to
understand oral communication.72  But there are dangers associated with the implantation
procedure itself,73 and some people who receive cochlear implants, including almost all adults
Complications, 99 ANNALS OTOLOGY, RHINOLOGY & LARYNGOLOGY 791, 791 (1990) (“In a
series of 52 patients who received cochlear implants, 4 patients suffered flap complications
(7.7%).”); Philip J. Hilts, Drug Agency Is Studying Ear Implants’ Links to Meningitis, N.Y.
TIMES, Aug. 3, 2002, at A7, A7 (reporting that “[t]he Food and Drug Administration is
investigating what appears to be an increase in meningitis among deaf patients who have had tiny
devices called cochlear implants surgically inserted deep inside their ears to help them hear”).
74 See, e.g., Dorman, supra note 72, at 19-20 (“Tests conducted in several countries
indicate, overwhelmingly, that patients who were deafened at birth and who were implanted as
adults obtain little speech understanding by means of an implant.  Of all the patients reported in
the literature, only a few individuals achieve speech understanding scores at a level above
chance.”).
75 See, e.g., William J. Boggess et al., Loss of Residual Hearing After Cochlear
Implantation, 99 LARYNGOSCOPE 1002, 1004 (1989) (“The findings indicate a significant
downward shift in the hearing thresholds of the implanted ear following the insertion of a 25-mm
electrode array.  Although some patients demonstrated smaller shifts than others, the shift is still
great enough to be considered clinically significant (greater than 5 dB) for all patients at one or
more frequencies for the implanted ear.  These findings are consistent with the previous clinical
reports . . . . Dye reported that 20% of single-channel cochlear implant recipients had a loss of
residual hearing attributable to the implant.  All of those patients received an older, long
electrode.  Rizer, et al. found that each of their six patients who received a long multichannel
electrode and the one reported patient who received a short single-channel electrode, showed a
loss of residual hearing.”); Bernard Fraysse et al., Cochlear Implants for Adults Obtaining
Marginal Benefit from Acoustic Amplification: A European Study, 19 AM. J. OTOLOGY 591, 594-
95 (1998) (“The comparison of thresholds showed that for all subjects, independent of the
surgical technique used, a clinically significant downward shift in unaided hearing thresholds
was observed for the implant ear after surgery with changes of $10-dB HL observed for at least
one of the speech frequencies.”); Th. Klenzner et al., Does Depth of Electrode Insertion
Influence Inner Ear Function in Cochlear Implant Patients?, in 1 4TH EUROPEAN CONGRESS OF
OTO-RHINO-LARYNGOLOGY HEAD AND NECK SURGERY 43, 43 (Klaus Jahnke & Markus Fischer
eds., 2000) (“Damage of inner ear function could be caused by the insertion of cochlear implant
(CI) electrodes.  In the literature the possibility of preserving residual hearing is estimated at
about 50%.”) (citation omitted); Henryk Skaróy½ski et al., Preservation of Residual Hearing in
Children and Post-Lingually Deafened Adults After Cochlear Implantation: An Initial Study, 64
ORL 247, 251 (2002) (reporting that “5 of 26 patients (19%) lost some residual hearing” and “5
of 26 (19%) patients lost all measurable residual hearing after cochlear implantation”).
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who were deaf at birth, still cannot process sound sufficiently well to comprehend speech.74  The
surgery, moreover, often damages and sometimes destroys any residual hearing that the person
has.75
Second, there is the risk that even if the mitigation does work, in the sense of
accomplishing what it was supposed to, it may have undesirable or dangerous side effects.  Some
76 See, e.g., D. Janet Pavlin et al., Pain as a Factor Complicating Recovery and
Discharge After Ambulatory Surgery, 95 ANESTHESIA & ANALGESIA 627, 627, 630 (2002) (“Pain
is the most common medical cause of delayed recovery and discharge after ambulatory
surgery . . . . The present study demonstrates the relevance of pain as a factor complicating the
recovery and discharge of patients after ambulatory surgery.  Nineteen percent of patients
reported severe pain after surgery (pain score $7 on a 10-point scale).”).
77 See, e.g., S.P. Conway et al., Compliance with Treatment in Adult Patients with Cystic
Fibrosis, 51 THORAX 29, 30-31 (1996) (“The degree of effort and time needed for adherence to
prescriptions for nebulised antibiotics, dietary supplements and inhaled bronchodilators
accounted for 60%, 41%, and 41% of missed doses, respectively.  Respondents gave more than
twice as many reasons for not doing physiotherapy as for any other treatment studied.  The major
reasons for omitting physiotherapy were the time and commitment it demands (44%) . . . .”); Seth
A. Eisen et al., The Effect of Prescribed Daily Dose Frequency on Patient Medication
Compliance, 150 ARCHIVES INTERNAL MED. 1881, 1881 (1990) (“The objective of this study was
to determine the relationship between prescribed daily dose frequency and patient medication
compliance.  The medication compliance of 105 patients receiving antihypertensive medications
was monitored by analyzing data obtained from special pill containers that electronically record
the date and time of medication removal. . . . Compliance was defined as the percent of days
during which the prescribed number of doses were removed.  Compliance improved from 59.0%
on a three-time daily regimen to 83.6% on a once-daily regimen.  Thus, compliance improves
dramatically as prescribed dose frequency decreases.  Probably the single most important action
that health care professionals can take to improve compliance is to select medications that permit
the lowest daily prescribed dose frequency.”).
78 See, e.g., Am. Psychiatric Ass’n, Practice Guideline for the Treatment of Patients with
Bipolar Disorder, 151 AM. J. PSYCHIATRY 1, 5 (Supp. Dec. 1994); Trevor Silverstone & Sarah
Romans, Long Term Treatment of Bipolar Disorder, 51 DRUGS 367, 367-68, 370 (1996).
79 See, e.g., Jørgen Aagaard & Per Vestergaard, Predictors of Outcome in Prophylactic
Lithium Treatment: A 2-Year Prospective Study, 18 J. AFFECTIVE DISORDERS 259, 260-61, 264
(1990) (“133 patients participated in the study . . . . The non-adherent group was defined as those
56 (42.1%) patients who stopped treatment at least once within the first 2 years.  None of these
patients were medically advised to stop. . . . The most frequent reason given by the patient to stop
treatment was side effects . . . .”); Kay R. Jamison et al., Patient and Physician Attitudes Toward
Lithium: Relationship to Compliance, 36 ARCHIVES GEN. PSYCHIATRY 866, 869 (1979)
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common adverse features of mitigation are the pain and convalescence period that can follow
surgery,76 and the time and effort consumed by complying with a treatment regime that may
require repeated medical visits or multiple doses of medication each day.77  In addition, many
mitigating measures have severe side effects.  Lithium, for example, is the leading medication for
the treatment of bipolar disorder.78  But people with bipolar disorder often stop taking lithium
because of its side effects,79 which can include impaired memory and cognitive functioning,80
(“Approximately one half of our patients reported discontinuing lithium treatment against
medical advice at least once.”); id. at 868 (“From the patient’s perspective, the most important
reasons for noncompliance were (1) they were bothered by the idea that their moods were
controlled by a medication; (2) they were bothered by the idea of having a chronic illness,
symbolized by the necessity of lithium therapy, and (3) side effects (particularly lethargy,
decreased coordination, and dulling of senses).  Those patients who reported actually
discontinuing lithium were significantly more likely to also report ‘missing highs’ and the hassle
of taking medications as important reasons for noncompliance.”); Mario Maj et al., Long-Term
Outcome of Lithium Prophylaxis in Bipolar Disorder: A 5-Year Prospective Study of 402
Patients at a Lithium Clinic, 155 AM. J. PSYCHIATRY 30, 30, 32 (1998) (“Of the 402 enrolled
patients, 27.9% were no longer taking lithium at follow-up . . . . Of the 112 interviewed patients
who were not taking lithium at follow-up, 95 (84.8%) had interrupted prophylaxis on their own
initiative.  The alleged main reason for interruption of medication was its perceived inefficacy in
35 cases, trouble related to side effects in 27, the conviction that the patient was cured and
needed no more drugs in 17, the annoyance of taking medicines in 11, and loss of energy or
productivity in five.”); A.J. Mander, Is Lithium Justified After One Manic Episode?, 73 ACTA
PSYCHIATRICA SCANDINAVICA 60, 66 (1986) (“The life table analysis clearly indicates that
lithium, if taken continuously and, presumably, for life, will significantly reduce the risk of
relapse.  However, many patients take their lithium for a limited time only, [so that] the outcome
of the group that the clinicians intended to treat [with lithium] is not different from the control
group.”); id. (“Most patients are only in their 3rd or 4th decade after their first admission for
mania.  They are unlikely to view the prospect of long-term prophylaxis with much enthusiasm,
especially with the possibility of serious side effects, which include tremor, renal problems and
the risk of accidental intoxication.  It is not surprising therefore that they quickly discontinue
it.”).
80 See, e.g., ROBERT M. JULIEN, A PRIMER OF DRUG ACTION: A CONCISE, NONTECHNICAL
GUIDE TO THE ACTIONS, USES, AND SIDE EFFECTS OF PSYCHOACTIVE DRUGS 316 (rev. ed. 2001)
(“Chronic lithium therapy is accompanied by adverse effects on memory and cognitive
functioning.  Some researchers report improvements in motor performance, cognition, and
creative ability after lithium withdrawal, implying detrimental effects of lithium in these areas
during drug therapy.”); Michael J. Gitlin et al., Maintenance Lithium Treatment: Side Effects and
Compliance, 50 J. CLINICAL PSYCHIATRY 127, 130 (1989) (“[P]atients indicated that they
perceived cognitive changes and weight gain as more troublesome and more likely to provoke
lithium noncompliance.  This observation was demonstrated by two findings: (1) the five side
effects most likely to cause noncompliance were cognitive and weight symptoms; and (2)
patients who self-reported lithium discontinuation perceived themselves as having greater
cognitive side effects in general—and mental slowness specifically—compared with patients
who reported never having stopped lithium treatment.”).
27
tremors,81 hypothyroidism,82 weight gain,83 birth defects,84 and a loss of the heightened creativity,
81 See, e.g., DIAGNOSTIC AND STATISTICAL MANUAL OF MENTAL DISORDERS 805-06 (4th
ed., text rev. 2000).
82 See, e.g., THE AMERICAN PSYCHIATRIC PRESS TEXTBOOK OF PSYCHIATRY 967 (Robert
E. Hales et al. eds., 2d ed. 1994) (“Hypothyroidism may occur in as many as 20% of patients
treated with lithium.”) (citations omitted); Rose Salata & Irwin Klein, Effects of Lithium on the
Endocrine System: A Review, 110 J. LABORATORY & CLINICAL MED. 130, 131 (1987) (“On the
average, 5% to 15% of patients given long-term lithium treatment are reported to show clinical
signs or chemical evidence of hypothyroidism.”).
83 See, e.g., Y. Chen & T. Silverstone, Lithium and Weight Gain, 5 INT’L CLINICAL
PSYCHOPHARMACOLOGY 217, 217 (1990) (“We found 14 studies concerning the clinical use of
lithium in which data on weight were given.  Weight gain was reported to have occurred in 11%
to 65% of the patients studied.  Among 100 patients taking lithium continuously for 1–2 years,
11 gained more than 5 kg and subsequent weight reduction was said to be difficult.”) (citations
omitted); P. Vestergaard et al., Prospective Studies on a Lithium Cohort: 3. Tremor, Weight
Gain, Diarrhea, Psychological Complaints, 78 ACTA PSYCHIATRICA SCANDINAVICA 434, 436
(1988) (“The body weight rose in 73% of the patients [taking lithium], fell in 18% and remained
constant in 9%.  A weight gain of 10 kg or more was seen in 21% of the patients, of 20 kg or
more in 2%.”).
84 See, e.g., JULIEN, supra note 80, at 316 (“Lithium possesses a degree of teratogenic
potential, especially to the heart of the developing fetus.”); Silverstone & Romans, supra note 78,
at 373 (“[L]ithium is not advised during pregnancy, particularly in the first trimester, as the risk
of fetal malformation involving the cardiovascular system (Ebstein’s anomaly) is greater in the
children of women prescribed this drug during pregnancy than that of women not so exposed.”).
85 For an eloquent account of this loss, see KAY REDFIELD JAMISON, AN UNQUIET MIND
5-6 (1995) (“My manias, at least in their early and mild forms, were absolutely intoxicating states
that gave rise to great personal pleasure, an incomparable flow of thoughts, and a ceaseless
energy that allowed the translation of new ideas into papers and projects.”); id. at 91-92 (“Even
though I was a clinician and a scientist, and even though I could read the research literature and
see the inevitable, bleak consequences of not taking lithium, I for many years after my initial
diagnosis was reluctant to take my medications as prescribed. . . . It was difficult to give up the
high flights of mind and mood, even though the depressions that inevitably followed nearly cost
me my life. . . . When I am my present ‘normal’ self, I am far removed from when I have been
my liveliest, most productive, most intense, most outgoing and effervescent.”).
28
mental concentration, and productivity that can be associated with mania.85  Similarly,
electroconvulsive therapy is one of the most effective treatments for major depression, yet it
86 See, e.g., Keith G. Rasmussen et al., Electroconvulsive Therapy and Newer Modalities
for the Treatment of Medication-Refractory Mental Illness, 77 MAYO CLINIC PROC. 552, 553-54
(2002); id. at 554 (“Electroconvulsive therapy-induced memory impairment takes 3 forms.  The
first is posttreatment confusion. . . . The second type of memory impairment with ECT is
anterograde amnesia. . . . the inability to recall information learned after the treatments have
begun. . . . The third and most bothersome type of ECT-induced memory impairment is
retrograde amnesia, forgetting things that happened before the course of treatments. . . . Usually,
only a few events, such as conversations, are forgotten, but patients occasionally forget most of
the events of this period.  Additionally, patients sometimes have sporadic episodes of forgetting
personal life events that happened several years before treatment.  Some of the forgotten events
may never be remembered.”).
87 See, e.g., JULIEN, supra note 80, at 290-91, 296; PHYSICIANS’ DESK REFERENCE 749-
50, 1106, 1111, 1344, 1347, 1682-83, 2676, 2679 (57th ed. 2003).
88 See, e.g., JULIEN, supra note 80, at 293; PHYSICIANS’ DESK REFERENCE, supra note 87,
at 1682-83.
89 See, e.g., JULIEN, supra note 80, at 290; PHYSICIANS’ DESK REFERENCE, supra note 87,
at 749-50, 1106, 1108-09.
90 See, e.g., JULIEN, supra note 80, at 290, 293, 301; PHYSICIANS’ DESK REFERENCE,
supra note 87, at 1106, 1111, 1603, 1607, 2562-63, 2627.
91 See, e.g., JULIEN, supra note 80, at 293, 297; PHYSICIANS’ DESK REFERENCE, supra
note 87, at 1603, 1607, 1682, 1685-86, 2562-63.
92 See, e.g., JULIEN, supra note 80, at 293-94, 297-98; PHYSICIANS’ DESK REFERENCE,
supra note 87, at 749-50, 1232, 1236, 1344, 1346, 1603, 1607, 2562-63, 2676, 2678-79.
93 See, e.g., PHYSICIANS’ DESK REFERENCE, supra note 87, at 749-50, 1232, 1236, 2562-
63.
94 See, e.g., JULIEN, supra note 80, at 302-03; PHYSICIANS’ DESK REFERENCE, supra note
87, at 2562.
95 See, e.g., JULIEN, supra note 80, at 96-97.
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commonly results in memory loss.86  There are also a variety of drugs available to treat
depression, but they can have side effects that include cognitive and memory impairment,87
seizures,88 blurred vision,89 sedation,90 sleep disturbances,91 sexual dysfunction,92 weight gain,93
and the risk of death if a person takes the antidepressants with certain foods and medicines.94 
Similarly, antiepileptic medications can cause interference with learning ability,95 aggressive
96 See, e.g., PHYSICIANS’ DESK REFERENCE, supra note 87, at 2906-07.
97 See, e.g., JULIEN, supra note 80, at 96.
98 See, e.g., id. at 96-97; PHYSICIANS’ DESK REFERENCE, supra note 87, at 421-22, 425,
3249-50.
99 See, e.g., PHYSICIANS’ DESK REFERENCE, supra note 87, at 421-23, 433, 3249-50.
100 See, e.g., id. at 2565-67.
101 See, e.g., Jouko I.T. Isojärvi et al., Obesity and Endocrine Disorders in Women Taking
Valproate for Epilepsy, 39 ANNALS NEUROLOGY 579, 582 (1996) (“More than half of our
patients taking valproate were obese, and the average increase in body weight in the 11 women
(50% of the subjects on valproate) experiencing an indisputable weight gain was 21 kg.  These
findings are in accordance with previous reports of weight gain in 44 to 57% of patients treated
with valproate.  Therefore, obesity seems to be a common and in some cases, a very severe
adverse effect of valproate treatment.”) (citation omitted).
102 See, e.g., JULIEN, supra note 80, at 98; PHYSICIANS’ DESK REFERENCE, supra note 87,
at 421-23, 433.
103 See, e.g., PHYSICIANS’ DESK REFERENCE, supra note 87, at 2464-65.
104 OLIVER SACKS, THE MAN WHO MISTOOK HIS WIFE FOR A HAT AND OTHER CLINICAL
TALES 95 (1985) (quoting Ray, a patient); see also id. at 96 (“‘You ‘normals’, who have the right
transmitters in the right places at the right times in your brains, have all feelings, all styles,
available all the time – gravity, levity, whatever is appropriate.  We Touretters don’t: we are
forced into levity by our Tourette’s and forced into gravity when we take haldol.  You are free,
you have a natural balance: we must make the best of an artificial balance.’” (quoting Ray)).
There is also the risk of something that might be considered a less obvious side effect of
mitigation: that the use of the mitigating device or process will itself be stigmatic.  Some
disabled people avoid using mitigating measures that make their disability more apparent in an
effort to avoid this stigma.  For instance, some people will walk with great difficulty and pain to
avoid using a wheelchair, or will greatly limit their daily movements to avoid using a walker. 
See, e.g., DENNIS BYRD & MICHAEL D’ORSO, RISE AND WALK: THE TRIAL AND TRIUMPH OF
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behavior,96 hyperactivity,97 blood disorders,98 liver damage,99 abnormal vision,100 weight gain,101
and birth defects.102  Haldol can help control the symptoms of Tourette’s syndrome, but it can
also have a number of side effects, including tardive dyskinesia, a potentially permanent
condition that causes the muscles in a person’s face and body to spasm and twitch
involuntarily.103  Moreover, Haldol can slow thought, curtail creative inspiration and expression,
and—in the words of one person with Tourette’s who decided to take the drug only during the
work week—make a person “‘sober, solid, [and] square.’”104
DENNIS BYRD 240 (1993); STEVE FIFFER, THREE QUARTERS, TWO DIMES, AND A NICKEL: A
MEMOIR OF BECOMING WHOLE 263 (1999); ROBERT F. MURPHY, THE BODY SILENT 61, 92-93
(1987); S. Kay Toombs, Sufficient unto the Day: A Life with Multiple Sclerosis, in CHRONIC
ILLNESS: FROM EXPERIENCE TO POLICY 3, 18 (S. Kay Toombs et al. eds., 1995).  Some people
will not use a white cane because they do not want to reveal their blindness.  See, e.g., STEPHEN
KUUSISTO, PLANET OF THE BLIND 65, 100 (1998); Jacobus tenBroek, The Right to Live in the
World: The Disabled in the Law of Torts, 54 CAL. L. REV. 841, 903 (1966).  Some people will
leave their mental illnesses untreated so that they do not have to identify themselves as mentally
ill.  See, e.g., JAMISON, supra note 85, at 54; see also Roberts v. County of Fairfax, Virginia, 937
F. Supp. 541, 543 (E.D. Va. 1996).
105 See, e.g., Ctrs. for Disease Control & Prevention, U.S. Dep’t of Health & Human
Servs., State-Specific Prevalence of Current Cigarette Smoking Among Adults — United States,
2002, 52 MORBIDITY & MORTALITY WKLY. REP. 1277, 1277 (2004) (“Cigarette smoking in the
United States causes serious illnesses among an estimated 8.6 million persons and approximately
440,000 deaths annually . . . .”) (footnote omitted); id. at 1278 (“During 2002, the median
prevalence of current smoking in the 50 states and DC was 23.1% (range: 12.7% [Utah]–32.6%
[Kentucky]).”) (citation omitted); Katherine M. Flegal et al., Prevalence and Trends in Obesity
Among US Adults, 1999-2000, 288 JAMA 1723, 1723 (2002) (“[A] [s]urvey of 4115 adult men
and women conducted in 1999 and 2000 as part of the National Health and Nutrition
Examination Survey (NHANES), a nationally representative sample of the US population. . . .
[found that] [t]he age-adjusted prevalence of obesity was 30.5% in 1999-2000 compared with
22.9% in [a nationally representative survey conducted between 1988 and 1994] . . . . The
prevalence of overweight also increased during this period from 55.9% to 64.5% . . . .”).
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If Title I plaintiffs were required to assume any risk and bear any side effect associated
with mitigation that could reduce their need for accommodation, that would mean that they
would have to endanger themselves, no matter the probability of benefit.  As we have seen, the
dangers associated with mitigation can be substantial, and mitigating measures with high failure
rates or serious side effects may have a relatively small chance of causing a notable improvement
in the plaintiff’s overall condition.  Requiring plaintiffs to assume any risk and bear any side
effect would also be massively inefficient, as it would encourage plaintiffs to expend significant
efforts on activities unlikely to make them more prepared for employment.  A person who
undertakes a mitigating measure that has a large risk of failure or that brings substantial side
effects may often do little to enhance his ability to work and may instead simply replace a
biological impairment with a medically induced one.
It would be similarly inappropriate to exclude plaintiffs from Title I protection because
they do not maintain extremely high levels of overall health as a means of mitigation.  While
even ablebodied Americans frequently have trouble sustaining high standards of general
health,105 some physical and mental impairments make general health maintenance especially
106 See, e.g., ABLE LIVES: WOMEN’S EXPERIENCE OF PARALYSIS 63 (Jenny Morris ed.,
1989) (“Many were concerned about putting on weight, echoing the problems faced by a lot of
non-disabled women as they grow older.  Most people tend to put on weight as they age, but we
have the added difficulty of not being able to exercise so easily, and of extra weight being more
noticeable when you are sitting down.”).
107 See supra text accompanying notes 83, 93, 101.
108 See, e.g., Alexander H. Glassman et al., Smoking, Smoking Cessation, and Major
Depression, 264 JAMA 1546, 1546 (1990) (“We conducted a test of th[e] association [‘between
cigarette smoking and major depressive disorder’], employing population-based data (n=3213)
collected between 1980 and 1983 in the St Louis Epidemiologic Catchment Area Survey of the
National Institute of Mental Health.  A history of regular smoking was observed more frequently
among individuals who had experienced major depressive disorder at some time in their lives
than among individuals who had never experienced major depression or among individuals with
no psychiatric diagnosis.  Smokers with major depression were also less successful at their
attempts to quit than were either of the comparison groups.”); id. at 1548 (“A multiple logistic
regression showed that the relationship between major depression and smoking was independent
of age, sex, education, marital status, and race . . . .”); John R. Hughes et al., Prevalence of
Smoking Amongst Psychiatric Outpatients, 143 AM. J. PSYCHIATRY 993, 993 (1986) (“The
prevalence of smoking among psychiatric outpatients (N=277) was significantly higher than
among either local or national population-based samples (N=1,440 and 17,000) (52% versus 30%
and 33%).  The higher prevalence was not associated with the age, sex, marital status,
socioeconomic status, alcohol use, coffee use, or institutionalization of the psychiatric patients. 
Smoking was especially prevalent among patients with schizophrenia (88%) or mania (70%) and
among the more severely ill patients.”); id. at 995 tbl.2 (reporting the smoking rates for patients
with major depressive disorder (49%), anxiety disorder (47%), personality disorder (46%), and
adjustment disorder (45%)); Karen Lasser et al., Smoking and Mental Illness: A Population-
Based Prevalence Study, 284 JAMA 2606, 2606 (2000) (“[In a nationally representative
population sample,] [c]urrent smoking rates for respondents with no mental illness, lifetime
mental illness, and past-month mental illness were 22.5%, 34.8%, and 41.0%, respectively. 
Lifetime smoking rates were 39.1%, 55.3%, and 59.0%, respectively . . . .  Smokers with any
history of mental illness had a self-reported quit rate of 37.1% . . . , and smokers with past-month
mental illness had a self-reported quit rate of 30.5% . . . compared with smokers without mental
illness (42.5%). . . . Persons with a mental disorder in the past month consumed approximately
44.3% of cigarettes smoked by this nationally representative sample.”); id. at 2607 (“We defined
mental illness as major depression, bipolar disorder, dysthymia, panic disorder, agoraphobia,
social phobia, simple phobia, generalized anxiety disorder, alcohol abuse, alcohol dependence,
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difficult.  Exercise may be arduous or impossible given some impairments.106  Weight gain is a
common side effect of many of the drugs designed to mitigate various disabilities.107  Studies
suggest that smoking, which is much more common among the mentally ill than in the general
population,108 can alleviate the symptoms of various mental illnesses and that some people with
drug abuse, drug dependence, antisocial personality, conduct disorder, or nonaffective psychosis. 
The latter includes schizophrenia, schizophreniform disorder, schizoaffective disorder, delusional
disorder, and atypical psychosis.”); id. at 2608 (“The relationship between smoking and mental
illness persisted when we controlled for age, sex, and geographic region using logistic regression
. . . .”).
109 See, e.g., Glassman, supra note 108, at 1548 (“In a recent examination of withdrawal
symptoms during the first week following smoking cessation, we observed that, among smokers
without a history of major depression, symptoms of depression were, in fact, rather uncommon
and, when they did occur, were generally mild.  However, among smokers with a history of
major depression, depressed mood during withdrawal was very common and was associated with
failure in smoking cessation efforts.”); id. at 1548-49 (“Clinical experience suggests that those
few depressed smokers who do succeed in stopping are at increased risk to develop another
episode of major depression.  We have seen a number of cases in which smokers with a history
of major depression who are not depressed at the time they try to quit get seriously depressed
shortly after giving up cigarettes.”); id. at 1549 (“[O]n a number of occasions we have seen
serious depressions that gradually developed following smoking cessation disappear within hours
of resuming cigarette smoking.  In addition, a number of these patients had experienced
depressive episodes associated with prior smoking cessation attempts.  These observations,
together with our earlier evidence that these smokers frequently develop depressive symptoms
when they try to stop, suggest that these are causally connected events and that nicotine
withdrawal can provoke episodes of major depression.”); Donald C. Goff et al., Cigarette
Smoking in Schizophrenia: Relationship to Psychopathology and Medication Side Effects, 149
AM. J. PSYCHIATRY 1189, 1192-93 (1992) (“Nicotine also improves concentration and decreases
distractibility in normal subjects evaluated with the Stroop Test.  Patients with schizophrenia
have been shown to be particularly impaired in their performance on this test, raising the
possibility that schizophrenic smokers may be self-medicating a cognitive deficit. . . . Self-
medication of more subtle cognitive or affective symptoms during adolescence, before the onset
of overt psychotic illness, may also contribute to the higher rate of smoking in schizophrenic
patients.”) (citations omitted).
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mental illnesses may use smoking to self-medicate.109  A disability can also be a source of stress,
110 See, e.g., Henry A. Jordan et al., Patterns of Weight Change: The Interval 6 to 10
Years After Initial Weight Loss in a Cognitive-Behavioral Treatment Program, 57 PSYCHOL.
REP. 195, 202 (1985) (“The fluctuation in weight over time may suggest, perhaps, that patients
may experience weight gains during periods of stress.  When the stress is alleviated, they lose the
weight.  Motivation for weight control for most of the present patients probably waxes and
wanes, perhaps in relation to the major events in their lives.  Such fluctuations are related not
only to a commitment to control eating but also to the effort necessary to handle both routine and
nonroutine life events.”).
111 See, e.g., Ovide F. Pomerleau & Cynthia S. Pomerleau, Neuroregulators and the
Reinforcement of Smoking: Towards a Biobehavioral Explanation, 8 NEUROSCIENCE &
BIOBEHAVIORAL REV. 503, 504 (1984) (“It has been observed that many schedules and situations
found to be effective in provoking nicotine self-administration might accurately be described as
stressful.  A link between nicotine and stress is also suggested by the findings of Schachter and
colleagues, who demonstrated that smokers smoke more when anxious or when subjected to
painful stimulation (e.g., before giving a lecture, during doctoral examinations, receiving electric
shocks, etc.).”) (citations omitted); see also Rose v. Home Depot U.S.A., Inc., 186 F. Supp. 2d
595, 614 n.7 (D. Md. 2002) (“Rose [who has respiratory problems] attempts to explain away his
smoking habit as an unavoidable condition, possibly even a disability. . . . He . . . blames his
‘smoking addiction’ on stress.  He states ‘[w]hen I am undergoing periods of stress, I smoke
more.  In the past, I have smoked as few as 1/2 pack of cigarettes a day (without Wellbutrin). 
When I am undergoing stressful periods, I have smoked up to two packs of cigarettes a day.’”);
LIZZIE SIMON, DETOUR: MY BIPOLAR ROAD TRIP IN 4-D, at 26 (2002) (“Lithium wasn’t the only
drug that helped me recover after I was diagnosed with manic depression.  Eventually I was
smoking pot about five times a day . . . . I needed to be high all the time because I couldn’t deal
with the intensity of what had happened to me . . . . For me, pot was a bridge back to real life, a
cushiony warm soft bridge that made the day-to-day OK while my brain and body adjusted to
lithium and while my soul began to digest the trauma.  Also, pot made it easy to be social again
after the most alienating and horrifying experience of my life.”).
112 42 U.S.C. § 12101(a)(6) (2000).
113 See, e.g., J. William Doyle et al., Glaucoma Medical Treatment—2002: Does Yearly
Cost Now Equal the Year?, 79 OPTOMETRY & VISION SCI. 489, 489 (2002).
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which may make weight gain110 and smoking111 more likely.
Along the same lines, a duty of mitigation that required disabled people to bear any
financial cost associated with mitigation, no matter their financial resources, would ignore
Congress’s recognition “that people with disabilities, as a group, . . . are severely disadvantaged
socially, vocationally, economically, and educationally.”112  Mitigation can sometimes be
expensive.  For example, glaucoma medication, needed to preserve vision, can cost over $2000 a
year.113  A manual wheelchair can cost between $500 and $4000, and a motorized wheelchair can
114 See, e.g., Lynn Bryant, Cost of Wheelchairs: Are You Paying Too Much?, ACCENT ON
LIVING, Fall 1994, at 28, 28; see also Ian Austen, A Leg with a Mind of Its Own, N.Y. TIMES,
Jan. 3, 2002, at G1, G4 (“The C-Leg [prosthetic leg], which was introduced to the United States
market in 1999, costs $40,000 to $50,000, compared with $15,000 for a non-electronic hydraulic
model.”).
115 See, e.g., Time to Deal with Hearing Loss?, CONSUMER REP. ON HEALTH, May 2002,
at 1, 1.
116 See, e.g., J. Robert Wyatt et al., Cost Utility of the Multichannel Cochlear Implant in
258 Profoundly Deaf Individuals, 106 LARYNGOSCOPE 816, 819 tbl.IV (1996).
117 See supra text accompanying notes 13-16.
118 See, e.g., Fuches v. S.E.S. Co., 459 N.W.2d 642, 643 (Iowa Ct. App. 1990) (“[A]
person may be excused from mitigating damages if they lack sufficient financial resources to do
so.”); Seagers v. Pailet, 656 So. 2d 700, 714 (La. Ct. App. 1995) (“Failure to undergo corrective
surgery because the plaintiff cannot monetarily afford to do so is not failure to mitigate
damages.”).
119 See Esteban v. Cook, 77 F. Supp. 2d 1256, 1257 (S.D. Fla. 1999).
120 See Steven Garber et al., Payment Under Public and Private Insurance and Access to
Cochlear Implants, 128 ARCHIVES OTOLARYNGOLOGY—HEAD & NECK SURGERY 1145, 1150
(2002).
121 See id.
122 See Time to Deal with Hearing Loss?, supra note 115, at 1.
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cost as much as $20,000.114  The cost of a single hearing aid can range from approximately $400
to approximately $3000,115 and a cochlear implant device can cost approximately $20,000.116
Not surprisingly, tort jurisprudence indicates that some disabled people do not have
access to the funds needed for mitigation,117 and that people disabled by tort are not obligated to
mitigate if they cannot afford the cost of doing so.118  Medicaid and private health insurance
policies do not always pay for mitigation.  For example, Medicaid programs in five states do not
provide customized wheelchairs to adults, and Medicaid programs in six states do not provide
motorized wheelchairs to adults.119  Medicaid programs in at least eighteen states usually or often
fail to cover the full cost of a cochlear implant device.120  Some private insurance policies also do
not cover the full cost of a cochlear implant device,121 and most private insurance policies do not
pay for hearing aids.122
More than forty million people in America, moreover, currently have no public or private
123 See U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, U.S. DEP’T OF COMMERCE, HEALTH INSURANCE COVERAGE
IN THE UNITED STATES: 2002, at 1 (2003) (“The share of the population without health insurance
rose in 2002, the second consecutive annual increase.  An estimated 15.2 percent of the
population or 43.6 million people were without health insurance coverage during the entire year
in 2002, up from 14.6 percent in 2001, an increase of 2.4 million people.”); id. at 7 (“Of those 18
to 64 years old in 2002, full-time workers were more likely to be covered by health insurance
(83.2 percent) than part-time workers (76.5 percent), who in turn were more likely to be insured
than non-workers (74.3 percent).”).
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health insurance, often because they are unemployed.123  It would be ironic if the duty of
mitigation denied some disabled people protection against employment discrimination because
they cannot afford to mitigate, when they cannot afford to mitigate because no one will hire
them.  Even if a disabled person managed to undertake mitigation by going into debt, protection
under Title I is no guarantee of obtaining employment.
Given that a disabled person’s reasons for not mitigating can sometimes be legitimate and
sometimes not, it would be inappropriate for the duty to mitigate to demand mitigation whenever
it could reduce the person’s need for accommodation.  A rule demanding all possible mitigation
to lessen accommodation requirements might, in its relative absoluteness, have the advantage of
relative clarity, but it would not take account of the plaintiff’s legitimate interests.  Yet that still
does not answer the question of when mitigation should be required.  A plaintiff seeking the
protection of Title I could, for example, be obligated to mitigate when mitigation is not too risky
for the plaintiff, or could be obligated to mitigate when mitigation is not overly difficult for the
plaintiff, or could be obligated to mitigate when mitigation is not too expensive for the plaintiff,
or could be obligated to mitigate when mitigation costs less than what the defendant would bear
in accommodating the plaintiff (a “least-cost-avoider” standard).
A duty of reasonable mitigation would have a number of advantages over these other
potential standards.  First, the reasonable mitigation standard is more universal than a standard
that looks exclusively at risk or difficulty or expense, and it provides courts with a means of
assessing the many different reasons why a disabled person might decide not to mitigate.  The
duty of reasonable mitigation would require a plaintiff seeking Title I protection to undertake
those mitigating measures that could reduce the plaintiff’s need for accommodation and that a
reasonable person in the same situation would undertake.  There are a variety of ways to define
the “same situation,” but some clear requirements suggested by the preceding discussion of
reasons for avoiding mitigation are that the reasonable person have the same condition, the same
mitigating measures available, and the same financial resources for mitigation.  This reasonable
mitigation standard would mean that a Title I plaintiff would be obligated to assume only those
risks or side effects that a reasonable person would assume to eliminate or improve the condition
in question, to take only those steps to improve his overall health that a reasonable person with
the same condition would take, and to bear only those costs associated with mitigation that a
reasonable person with the same financial means would bear.  In this way, the reasonable
mitigation standard would provide some assurance that the law is not obligating Title I plaintiffs
to subject themselves to pointless harm, along with a means of recognizing the obstacles to
health maintenance that a plaintiff may be experiencing and adjusting for what the plaintiff can
124 42 U.S.C. § 12101(a)(2) (2000).
125 See supra Part I.
126 42 U.S.C. § 12112(b)(5)(A).
127 Compared to a least-cost-avoider standard, a duty of reasonable mitigation would also
make it more possible for disabled people to assess whether they have complied with the duty to
mitigate, and to plan accordingly.  The reasonable mitigation standard depends on information
outside the employer’s control, such as information about what other disabled people in the same
situation have done.  See infra text accompanying notes 134-137.  A least-cost-avoider standard,
in contrast, depends on the defendant’s cost of accommodation, information that the employer
controls and that only it may know.  A disabled person may have few ways of determining an
employer’s cost of accommodation until he requests an accommodation, and even then he may
not gain access to all the relevant data.
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afford.
Second, the reasonable mitigation standard advances the ADA’s goal of combating the
“isolat[ion] and segregat[ion]” of disabled people.124  A least-cost-avoider standard for applying
the duty to mitigate would promote the clustering of disabled employees in relatively few
workplaces—those able to provide accommodations at relatively low cost because of their
efficiency, economies of scale, centralized location, or industry.  Plaintiffs suing employers with
relatively low costs of accommodation would be more likely to win Title I protection on the
ground that mitigation would be more expensive than accommodation; plaintiffs suing employers
with relatively high costs of accommodation would be more likely to be denied Title I protection
on the ground that accommodation would be more expensive than mitigation.  This clustering of
disabled employees, however, would at least partially frustrate the ADA’s commitment to the
integration of disabled people in the workplace.  The clustering would also help concentrate the
costs that Title I imposes on a relatively small group of employers, which would raise
distributional fairness concerns.125  A least-cost-avoider standard for applying the duty to mitigate
is not necessary to limit an employer’s financial liability, moreover.  Title I already provides that
an employer does not have to make an accommodation where it “can demonstrate that the
accommodation would impose an undue hardship on the operation of [its] business.”126  Perhaps
more importantly, the duty of reasonable mitigation leaves employers with significant flexibility
in many situations where the cost of mitigation is less than the cost of accommodation.  Where
mitigation would be reasonable but for the expense it would impose on the plaintiff, and the
defendant-employer agrees to bear all or part of that expense, the plaintiff would be obligated to
mitigate if a reasonable person in the plaintiff’s situation, faced with whatever expenses remain,
would mitigate.
Third, the reasonable mitigation standard should not be unduly difficult for courts to
administer because judges and juries have substantial experience in applying similar standards of
reasonable mitigation to many related legal contexts.127  Defendants in common law tort actions,
for example, frequently contend that the people they have disabled by tort have failed to mitigate,
128 See, e.g., Stark v. Shell Oil Co., 450 F.2d 994, 997 (5th Cir. 1971) (“This case is
governed by Louisiana law.  The law of Louisiana is that an injured person must submit to
reasonable treatment, including an operation if it is shown that the operation will alleviate the
disability.”) (citation omitted); Salas v. United States, 974 F. Supp. 202, 211 (W.D.N.Y. 1997)
(“Under New York law, an injured party has a duty to mitigate her damages, and in that regard is
required to make a reasonable effort and to act as a reasonable, prudent person would under the
circumstances.”); Greenwood v. Mitchell, 621 N.W.2d 200, 205 (Iowa 2001) (“[T]here must be
substantial evidence that there was something that the plaintiff could do to mitigate his loss and
that requiring the plaintiff to do so was reasonable under the circumstances.  Furthermore, it must
be shown that the plaintiff acted unreasonably in failing to undertake the mitigating activity.”)
(citation omitted); Jacobs v. New Orleans Pub. Serv., Inc., 432 So. 2d 843, 845 (La. 1983) (“[A]n
accident victim has a duty to exercise reasonable diligence and ordinary care to minimize his
damages after the injury has been inflicted.”); Michaud v. Steckino, 390 A.2d 524, 531 (Me.
1978) (“There is a positive duty upon a person injured through the negligence of another to
minimize his damages and to use reasonable diligence in securing medical or surgical aid.”);
Adee v. Evanson, 281 N.W.2d 177, 180 (Minn. 1979) (“Plaintiff has a duty to mitigate damages
by acting reasonably in obtaining treatment for her injury.”); Flight Line, Inc. v. Tanksley, 608
So. 2d 1149, 1162-63 (Miss. 1992) (“Without question, a person injured in tort is required to take
reasonable steps to mitigate his damages, and this, at the very least, includes giving attention to
doctor’s orders regarding his course of recovery.”); Frisnegger v. Gibson, 598 P.2d 574, 581
(Mont. 1979) (“[T]he trial court . . . allowed the jury to consider whether Frisnegger should have
submitted to treatment, including possible surgery, on the reasonable person test.  Where
mitigation of damages is concerned, we have supported the reasonable person test or the
ordinarily prudent person test in property damage cases.  We hold that the District Court properly
submitted the mitigation issues to the jury on that basis here . . . .”) (citations omitted);
Automatic Merchandisers, Inc. v. Ward, 646 P.2d 553, 554 (Nev. 1982) (per curiam) (“It is
unquestioned that an injured person cannot recover for damages which could have been avoided
by the exercise of reasonable care.  The doctrine of mitigation of damages has been applied to
preclude recovery for disability which could have been avoided if the plaintiff had exercised
reasonable diligence in seeking medical care, including surgical treatment.”) (citation omitted);
Favier v. Winick, 583 N.Y.S.2d 907, 908 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1992) (“Generally, a party who claims
to have suffered personal injuries by reason of the defendant’s negligence or other tortious
conduct is required to use reasonable and proper effort to make the damage as small as
practicable, and is not entitled to recover for any damage which by the use of such effort might
have been avoided.”) (citations omitted); Dunn v. Maxey, 693 N.E.2d 1138, 1140 (Ohio Ct. App.
1997) (“The law in Ohio precludes one who is injured by the tort of another from recovering
damages for harm that could have been avoided by reasonable effort or expenditure after the
commission of the tort.”); Zimmerman v. Ausland, 513 P.2d 1167, 1169 (Or. 1973) (“It is
equally well established that the plaintiff in a personal injury case cannot claim damages for what
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and many courts have held in these cases that a tort victim’s damage award will be reduced if he
did not undertake mitigating measures that a reasonable person in the same situation would have
undertaken.128  This jurisprudence, in turn, evaluates when mitigation is reasonable,129 and when 
would otherwise be a permanent injury if the permanency of the injury could have been avoided
by submitting to treatment by a physician, including possible surgery, when a reasonable person
would do so under the same circumstances.”); Yost v. Union R.R. Co., 551 A.2d 317, 322 (Pa.
Super. Ct. 1988) (“When determining damages for personal injuries in Pennsylvania, it is proper
for a jury to consider the failure of the plaintiff to undergo surgery or medical treatment that an
ordinarily prudent man would have submitted to under the circumstances in an effort to better his
condition.”); Cox v. Keg Rests. U.S., Inc., 935 P.2d 1377, 1380 (Wash. Ct. App. 1997) (“An
injured party generally may not recover damages proximately caused by that person’s
unreasonable failure to mitigate.”); Lobermeier v. Gen. Tel. Co. of Wis., 349 N.W.2d 466, 474
(Wis. 1984) (“The question is one of fact for the jury—what was a reasonable course of conduct,
under the circumstances, to mitigate the injuries or damages.”).
129 See, e.g., Pisciotta v. Allstate Ins. Co., 385 So. 2d 1176, 1182 (La. 1979) (“Dr. Vogel
opined that at least eighty or ninety percent of the patient’s discomfort should be relieved by
treatment, which would probably include an operation. . . . We therefore agree that the trial
court’s award should be amended to eliminate any recovery for permanent loss of earning
capacity.”); Leaman v. Cont’l Cas. Co., 798 So. 2d 285, 293 (La. Ct. App. 2001) (“[W]e find that
Cooper’s decision not to use a permanent orthodontic retainer or splint recommended by her
orthodontist, Dr. Marshall Gottsgen, was error.”); Flight Line, Inc., 608 So. 2d at 1162-63
(“Substantial evidence reflects Tanksley did not follow doctor’s orders and likely worsened his
injuries as result.  On November 4, 1984, he ignored instructions and reinjured himself, and it is
true this led to his first surgery.  Following this first surgery, Tanksley did indeed lie about a
pinprick test because he was bored at home and thought he should return to work and, as a result,
Dr. Stringer released him to go back to work to ‘light duty’ sooner than he otherwise would have. 
After the surgery, he worked difficult, strenuous shifts and further aggravated his condition. 
Without question, a person injured in tort is required to take reasonable steps to mitigate his
damages, and this, at the very least, includes giving attention to doctor’s orders regarding his
course of recovery.  In the relevant posture of the case, the Circuit Court was no doubt obliged to
accept that Tanksley had failed in this duty, that he had in fact aggravated his condition by his
own course of conduct.”) (citations omitted).
130 See, e.g., Stark, 450 F.2d at 998 (“We think that Shell’s proof fell far short of
demonstrating that Stark unreasonably refused to submit to treatment of his back injury.  Even
without weighing the seriousness of the operation proposed by Dr. Purvis, there was no showing
that that operation offered a reasonable certainty of correcting the disability.  There was direct
medical testimony that it did not.  There was also the undisputed evidence that an identical
operation had already been performed with negative results.”); Automatic Merchandisers, Inc.,
646 P.2d at 555 (“[A]ppellant failed to present evidence that respondent’s disinclination to
undergo surgery was unreasonable. . . . [S]urgery was not even consistently recommended prior
to trial, and neither Ward’s treating physician nor appellant’s expert witness recommended
surgical intervention by the time of trial, since respondent’s condition had improved with
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it is not.130  Along the same lines, many courts reviewing the decisions of workers’ compensation
conservative treatment.”); Zimmerman, 513 P.2d at 1171 (“Neither is there any evidence that
plaintiff had been advised by any doctor that she should submit to a surgical operation on her
knee and that she then failed or refused to do so.  Indeed, both plaintiff’s and defendant’s doctors
agreed that surgery was not indicated at the time of their examination. . . . No case has been cited
to us in which it has been held that a plaintiff with a torn cartilage in the knee must submit to
surgery to remove the damaged cartilage or be barred, as a matter of law, from seeking damages
for an otherwise permanent injury, at least in the absence of such evidence.”); Cox, 935 P.2d at
1380 (“The Keg first argues that Cox’s unreasonable failure to mitigate is demonstrated by his
refusal to have his shunt removed or restructured as recommended by his physiatrist, Dr. Evan
Cantini.  But Cantini only testified that he felt that it might have been useful to consider revising
or eliminating the shunt and that he discussed shunt revision as a treatment option. . . . Moreover,
Cantini stated that he was not an expert in evaluating hydrocephalus and deferred to Cox’s
neurosurgeon, Dr. Richard Winn, who testified that it was reasonable to decline a shunt
revision.”).
131 See, e.g., Thurman v. Clarke Indus., Inc., 872 S.W.2d 418, 420 (Ark. Ct. App. 1994)
(en banc) (“Section 11-9-512 provides as follows: ‘Except in cases of hernia, which are
specifically covered by § 11-9-523, where an injured person unreasonably refuses to submit to a
surgical operation which has been advised by at least two (2) qualified physicians and where the
recommended operation does not involve unreasonable risk of life or additional serious physical
impairment, the Commission, in fixing the amount of compensation, may take into consideration
such refusal to submit to the advised operation.’”); Beth-Elkhorn Corp. v. Epling, 450 S.W.2d
814, 815 (Ky. 1970) (“KRS 342.035(2) provides, so far as pertinent to this case: ‘No
compensation shall be payable for the * * * disability of an employe[e] * * * in so far as his
disability is * * * continued, by an unreasonable failure to submit to or follow any competent
surgical treatment or medical aid or advice.’”); Veal v. Trans Gulf, Inc., 723 So. 2d 987, 992 (La.
Ct. App. 1998) (per curiam) (“Though the claimant cannot be forced to submit to surgery, his
compensation may be jeopardized if he unreasonably refuses.”); Gordon v. Me. Reduction Co.,
358 A.2d 544, 548 (Me. 1976) (per curiam) (“We do not doubt that under 39 M.R.S.A. § 65 a
claimant’s unreasonable refusal to submit to surgery or any reasonable examination attendant
thereto is an affirmative defense to the employer’s obligation to continue to provide
compensation benefits . . . .”) (footnote omitted); Jacobs v. Ryder Sys./Complete Auto Transit,
789 S.W.2d 233, 235 (Mo. Ct. App. 1990) (“A claimant’s refusal to submit to medical treatment
bars an award of compensation only when the refusal is unreasonable.”); Yarns v. Leon Plastics,
Inc., 464 N.W.2d 801, 804 (Neb. 1991) (“[W]hile a disabled employee may not be required to
undergo surgery, an unreasonable refusal to submit to surgery, taking into account the risk
involved to the employee, the nature of the surgery, and the likelihood of improving the
condition, may result in the forfeiture or reduction of compensation benefits, as may be
appropriate.”); Saif Corp. v. Orr, 792 P.2d 454, 456 (Or. Ct. App. 1990) (“A claimant who
unreasonably fails or refuses to mitigate the extent of his permanent disability is not entitled to
40
boards have found that a plaintiff seeking compensation for a workplace accident has a duty to
take reasonable steps to mitigate his injury.131  Similarly, many courts reviewing decisions on
compensation for that portion of his disability attributable to the unreasonable failure or
refusal.”); Am. Red Cross v. Workers’ Comp. Appeal Bd., 741 A.2d 244, 247 (Pa. Commw. Ct.
1999) (“Section 306(f.1)(8) of the Workers’ Compensation Act . . . provides: ‘If the employe[e]
shall refuse reasonable services of health care providers, surgical, medical and hospital services,
treatment, medicines and supplies, he shall forfeit all rights to compensation for any injury or
increase in his incapacity shown to have resulted from such refusal.’”); Klein Indus. Salvage v.
Dep’t of Indus., Labor & Human Relations, 259 N.W.2d 124, 125 (Wis. 1977) (per curiam)
(“Under the Workers’ Compensation Act, a claimant may receive reduced benefits or be denied
them altogether if he or she fails to mitigate the damages resulting from a work-related injury. 
The statute provides as follows: ‘TREATMENT REJECTED BY EMPLOYE[E].  Unless the
employe[e] shall have elected Christian Science treatment . . . , no compensation shall be payable
for the death or disability of an employe[e], if his death be caused, or insofar as his disability may
be aggravated, caused or continued (a) by an unreasonable refusal or neglect to submit to or
follow any competent and reasonable medical or surgical treatment . . . .’”).
132 Johnson v. Sec’y of Health & Human Servs., 794 F.2d 1106, 1111 (6th Cir. 1986); see
also Gross v. Heckler, 785 F.2d 1163, 1166 (4th Cir. 1986) (per curiam) (“If a symptom can be
reasonably controlled by medication or treatment, it is not disabling.”); Schena v. Sec’y of Health
& Human Servs., 635 F.2d 15, 19 (1st Cir. 1980) (“‘In determining whether a claimant’s refusal
to undergo treatment is reasonable–i. e. supported by justifiable cause under 20 C.F.R. §
404.1507–several factors must be considered.’ . . . A reasonable fear may justify the refusal of
treatment.”) (citation omitted); Hephner v. Mathews, 574 F.2d 359, 362 (6th Cir. 1978) (“The
Secretary’s reliance on appellant’s refusal to undergo a surgical spinal fusion does not support a
denial of benefits.  Appellant’s surgeon testified that it was not unreasonable for his patient to
decline to submit to this serious surgery.”) (citation omitted); Nichols v. Califano, 556 F.2d 931,
933 (9th Cir. 1977) (“A claimant under a disability need not submit to all treatment, no matter
how painful, dangerous, or uncertain of success, merely because one physician believes that a
remedy may be effective.  In determining whether a claimant’s refusal to undergo treatment is
reasonable—i. e., supported by justifiable cause under 20 C.F.R. § 404.1507—several factors
must be considered.”) (citations omitted); Fessler v. Apfel, 11 F. Supp. 2d 1244, 1253 (D. Colo.
1998) (“‘If an impairment can reasonably be treated or controlled it cannot constitute a
disability.’”) (citation omitted); Valdez v. Heckler, 616 F. Supp. 933, 939 (N.D. Cal. 1985)
(“Impairments that can be reasonably remedied by treatment cannot function as the basis for a
finding of disability.”); Benedict v. Heckler, 593 F. Supp. 755, 760-61 (E.D.N.Y. 1984) (“[E]ven
if the treatment were prescribed and would restore plaintiff’s ability to work, plaintiff may still
refuse such treatment where justifiable cause exists. . . . The overwhelming majority of cases in
this area deal with the refusal of surgery.  In those cases, doctor’s predictions of success, patient’s
fear of pain, or fear of the surgery itself and even the doctor-patient relationship are factors to be
considered.  The refusal, however, must be reasonable.”) (citations omitted); Martin v.
Schweiker, 550 F. Supp. 199, 201 (N.D. Cal. 1982) (“It is well settled that where an impairment
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Social Security disability benefits have held that benefits will be denied to a claimant with “an
impairment that can be remedied by treatment with reasonable effort and safety.”132  Courts
reasonably can be remedied by treatment, it cannot serve as the basis for disability.”); Holguin v.
Harris, 480 F. Supp. 1171, 1179 (N.D. Cal. 1979) (“If an impairment reasonably can be remedied
or controlled by treatment or medication, it cannot serve as a basis for a finding of disability.”);
Fletcher v. Califano, 471 F. Supp. 317, 320 (N.D. Tex. 1979) (“If an impairment can reasonably
be remedied or controlled by treatment, it cannot serve as a basis for a finding of disability.”);
Locklear v. Mathews, 424 F. Supp. 639, 647 (D. Md. 1976) (“‘[I]f an impairment reasonably can
be remedied by treatment, it can not serve as a basis for a finding of disability.’”) (citation
omitted).
133 See, e.g., Provident Life & Accident Ins. Co. v. Henry, 106 F. Supp. 2d 1002, 1003-04
(C.D. Cal. 2000) (“On apparent first impression in the Ninth Circuit, the Court holds a disability
insurance policy may condition benefits on the insured’s consent to appropriate medical care,
which may include surgery. . . . [T]he appropriate-care provision [in the disability insurance
policy] here creates an explicit duty to seek and accept appropriate treatment.”); Doe v. Provident
Life & Accident Ins. Co., No. 96-3951, slip op. at 3 (E.D. Pa. Dec. 30, 1997) (“‘[P]olicies 335
and 337 . . . require that plaintiff be ‘receiving care by a physician which is appropriate for the
condition causing the disability’ in order to be entitled to benefits. . . . ‘Appropriate’ means
suitable under the circumstances.  It does not mean perfect care, or the best possible care.  Thus,
in order to prove he is entitled to total disability under policies # 335 and # 337, the plaintiff
must also prove that he has received appropriate care for his allegedly disabling condition.’”
(quoting jury instructions)); Casson v. Nationwide Ins. Co., 455 A.2d 361, 367 (Del. Super. Ct.
1982) (“Delaware decisional law is aligned with the opposite view—that an insured must submit
to treatment to which a reasonably prudent man would ordinarily submit if the disability is
correctable.  If the insured fails or refuses to submit to reasonable treatment recommended by
competent physicians, he is precluded from recovery for the disability for the period the cure
would have become effective. . . . I conclude that the duty to minimize a claimed disability is a
condition precedent to Nationwide’s liability under the contract with plaintiff and that such
condition was implied in the policy as a matter of law.”) (citations omitted).
134 Reasonableness is a question for the jury or for the judge acting as a finder of fact,
unless no reasonable jury could find that the plaintiff’s actions were reasonable.  See, e.g., TSC
Indus., Inc. v. Northway, Inc., 426 U.S. 438, 450 n.12 (1976) (“[T]he jury’s unique competence
in applying the ‘reasonable man’ standard is thought ordinarily to preclude summary judgment in
negligence cases.”); Reed v. MBNA Mktg. Sys., Inc., 333 F.3d 27, 34 (1st Cir. 2003) (“[Even if
the] raw facts are undisputed . . . . the judgment call as to reasonableness is itself a jury issue
unless no reasonable jury could decide it in the plaintiff’s favor.”); King v. Crossland Sav. Bank,
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interpreting private disability insurance policies have also found that some policies either
explicitly or implicitly condition benefits on the insured’s pursuit of reasonable mitigation.133
One piece of evidence that fact-finders judging the reasonableness of a plaintiff’s actions
should consider when it is available is what other people in the same situation—with the same
condition, the same available mitigating measures, and the same financial resources—have
actually done.134  The more people in the plaintiff’s situation who have mitigated, the stronger the
111 F.3d 251, 259 (2d Cir. 1997) (“[T]he assessment of reasonableness generally is a factual
question to be addressed by the jury.”); West v. State Farm Fire & Cas. Co., 868 F.2d 348, 351
(9th Cir. 1989) (per curiam) (“[T]he cases show that reasonableness becomes a question of law
appropriate for determination on motion for summary judgment when only one conclusion about
the conduct’s reasonableness is possible.”); Matthews v. Ashland Chem., Inc., 703 F.2d 921,
925-26 (5th Cir. 1983) (“[E]ven where there is no dispute as to the facts, it is usually for the jury
to decide whether the conduct in question meets the reasonable man standard.  Issues that require
the determination of the reasonableness of the acts and conduct of the parties under all the facts
and circumstances of the case, cannot ordinarily be disposed of by summary judgment.”)
(citations and internal quotation marks omitted).
135 See supra text accompanying note 19; infra text accompanying notes 140-160.
136 For instance, Martin Milligan, a blind philosopher, explains that: “Certainly, if doctors
said there was now a good chance of restoring my sight by an operation, I would be actively
interested.”  Letter 4: From Martin Milligan to Bryan Magee, in ON BLINDNESS: LETTERS
BETWEEN BRYAN MAGEE AND MARTIN MILLIGAN 34, 34-36 (1995).  Blindness “is so
disadvantaging in such a wide range of frequently encountered circumstances that” it “would still
be a serious handicap even if we blind people constituted the overwhelming majority of the
world’s population, and could arrange things to suit ourselves, and could subject the remaining
sighted people to our will.”  Id. at 38.  Bonnie Poitras Tucker, a lawyer and legal academic, states
that she “would gladly grab any opportunity to fix [her] deafness” because “[d]eaf people lack
one of the five critical senses, plain and simple.”  BONNIE POITRAS TUCKER, THE FEEL OF
SILENCE, at xix, xxi (1995).  Jenny Morris, a disability rights activist who was paralyzed in an
accident, similarly reports “that even if the physical environment in which I live posed no
physical barriers, I would still rather walk than not be able to walk.  However non-discriminatory
the society in which I lived, to be able to walk would give me more choices and experiences than
not being able to walk.”  JENNY MORRIS, PRIDE AGAINST PREJUDICE: TRANSFORMING
ATTITUDES TO DISABILITY 1-2, 71 (1991).
On other disabilities, see JASON KINGSLEY & MITCHELL LEVITZ, COUNT US IN: GROWING
UP WITH DOWN SYNDROME 35 (1994) (“Mitchell: I wish I didn’t have Down syndrome because I
would be a regular person, a regular mainstream normal person.”) (original emphasis omitted);
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evidence that mitigation is the only reasonable choice.  Examining this sort of empirical evidence
could improve consistency between cases, and would provide fact-finders with a firm foundation
on which to make their judgments of reasonableness.  It would also allow reasonableness to be
judged with some reference to the choices that disabled people themselves have made.
The record of disabled people’s own decisions is a valuable source of information for at
least two reasons.  First, disabled people have strong incentives to seek out and pursue beneficial
mitigating measures.  The biological and physical disadvantages that can be associated with
disability are widely (although not universally)135 acknowledged among the disabled.  Many
disabled people, with a large variety of disabilities, stress these disadvantages and explain that
they would prefer to be ablebodied for that reason.136  Mitigation can vastly increase a person’s
SUSAN WENDELL, THE REJECTED BODY: FEMINIST PHILOSOPHICAL REFLECTIONS ON DISABILITY
175, 2 (1996) (“I would joyfully accept a cure [for chronic fatigue immune dysfunction
syndrome] if it were offered me . . . .”); Harilyn Rousso, Fostering Healthy Self Esteem,
EXCEPTIONAL PARENT, Dec. 1984, at 9, 9-10 (“It is not that I would choose to be disabled [with
cerebral palsy] . . . .”); Toombs, supra note 104, at 19-20 (“Multiple sclerosis is an unlucky
break, and I wish I didn’t have it. . . . [T]here is nothing intrinsically good about chronic,
progressive multiple sclerosis.”).
137 See, e.g., John R. Bach & Denise I. Campagnolo, Psychosocial Adjustment of Post-
Poliomyelitis Ventilator Assisted Individuals, 73 ARCHIVES PHYSICAL MED. & REHABILITATION
934, 934 (1992) (“The effect of severe disability, tracheostomy, and ventilator use on
psychosocial functioning, gainful employment, life satisfaction, and perceived well-being were
studied for a population of 395 ventilator assisted post-poliomyelitis individuals (PVAIs). . . .
Two-hundred-seventy-three physically intact health care professionals served as controls. . . . The
controls significantly underestimated the patients’ life satisfaction and well-being scores and
significantly overestimated the relative hardship associated with ventilator use.”); John R. Bach
& Margaret C. Tilton, Life Satisfaction and Well-Being Measures in Ventilator Assisted
Individuals with Traumatic Tetraplegia, 75 ARCHIVES PHYSICAL MED. & REHABILITATION 626,
626 (1994) (“This study evaluates the effect of complete traumatic tetraplegia on the life
satisfaction and well-being of 87 individuals, 42 of whom are ventilator supported, 2 years or
more postinjury. . . . The . . . life satisfaction [of the ‘ventilator assisted individuals with
tetraplegia’] and other well-being and quality of life indicators were generally positive, and were
significantly underestimated by a control group of health care professionals.”); Eugenia
Bodenhamer et al., Staff and Patient Perceptions of the Psychosocial Concerns of Spinal Cord
Injured Persons, 62 AM. J. PHYSICAL MED. 182, 188 (1983) (“[H]ighly significant differences
occurred between staff and [the spinal cord injured (SCI)] patients’ responses on the four scales
of Anxiety, Depression, Social Discomfort, and Positive Outlook. . . . An inspection of the means
indicates the staff tended to overestimate the amount of depression and social discomfort, and
underestimate positive outlook and anxiety.”); id. at 191 (“[S]ix of the seven staff members who
were most accurate in their predictions of patient responses were new to SCI service, having
worked only a year or less with spinal cord injured patients.”); Laura A. Cushman & Marcel P.
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realistic chances of securing employment.  It generally makes people more able to work, and
many, if not most, employers will evaluate employees and job applicants who have mitigated in
their mitigated state.  Mitigation also frequently improves the quality of a disabled person’s life
outside work.  Disabled people, considered as a group, have powerful motivations to undertake
reasonable mitigation, although any one disabled individual will not necessarily act reasonably.
Second, evidence about what other disabled people in the same situation have done can
reveal information missing from medical or other outside expert judgments about the disabled. 
Studies suggest that experts do not always accurately understand disabled people.  For instance, a
number of studies have found that health care professionals estimate the quality of their disabled
patients’ lives to be much lower than what the patients themselves report, which may lead the
professionals to prescribe too much treatment.137  Using the record of disabled people’s own
Dijkers, Depressed Mood in Spinal Cord Injured Patients: Staff Perceptions and Patient
Realities, 71 ARCHIVES PHYSICAL MED. & REHABILITATION 191, 195 (1990) (“There was . . . a
consistent bias on the part of staff to overestimate depressed mood, relative to the report of [the
SCI] patients themselves.  This is consistent with the suggestion that patient behavior is
interpreted according to the prevailing professional ideology; in the case of rehabilitation
personnel, this view includes depression as a necessary phase of adjustment to SCI.”); Frederick
A. Ernst, Contrasting Perceptions of Distress by Research Personnel and Their Spinal Cord
Injured Subjects, 66 AM. J. PHYSICAL MED. 12, 13-14 (1987) (“The results of the present study
replicate and extend those of Bodenhamer, et al. (1983) who reported serious discrepancies in
perception of distress comparing SCI patients and the rehabilitative professionals who treat
them. . . . [O]ur staff overestimated distress on all four of the questionnaire’s measures, including
anxiety.”).
138 See, e.g., Yukio Kubota et al., Frequency of Anesthetic Cardiac Arrest and Death in
the Operating Room at a Single General Hospital over a 30-Year Period, 6 J. CLINICAL
ANESTHESIA 227, 230-31 (1994) (“Over the 30 years of this prospective study, 85,708
anesthetics of all kinds were performed in the OR [operating room].  During that time, four CAs
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decisions as evidence in the evaluation of reasonableness can help counteract this bias.
B. Two Hard Categories of Cases
The reasonable mitigation standard also provides an appropriate means of handling two
particularly hard categories of cases.  The first involves disabled people who do not want to take
a mitigating measure because of the associated risks or side effects, when those risks or side
effects are serious but ones that a reasonable person in the same situation would nevertheless
assume for the expected benefit.  The second involves the small number of disabled people, most
frequently members of the deaf community, who refuse mitigation that a reasonable person in
their situation would undertake because they believe that their disability is central to their cultural
identity.  This section will explore why these cases raise hard issues.  It concludes, however, that
disabled people in each of these situations should still be subject to the duty of reasonable
mitigation, although courts should consider a plaintiff’s interests and claims carefully before
deciding that the plaintiff’s decision not to mitigate is unreasonable.
These categories of cases are difficult because they involve unreasonable decisions not to
mitigate in circumstances where reasonable mitigation would require especially large sacrifices,
at least from the perspective of the disabled person at issue.  Without doubt, a disabled person
can have legitimate concerns about risks or side effects that he alone will have to bear, and these
concerns may be greatest where the risks or side effects involve serious harm.  Imagine, for
instance, the distress that the duty of reasonable mitigation could cause a disabled person who
does not want to undergo mitigating surgery because he fears the risk of death associated with the
use of anesthesia, when the disabled person knows that a reasonable person would undergo the
surgery because it usually ameliorates the disability in question and death is very unlikely to
occur.138  Consider the dilemma of a person with a serious impairment who does not want to take
[cardiac arrests] occurred during anesthesia.  Thus, the frequency of CAs is estimated to be 1 in
21,427, or 0.5 in 10,000, anesthetics.  Three of our patients were successfully resuscitated, and
one died, yielding a mortality rate during anesthesia of 1 in 85,708, or 0.1 in 10,000, anesthetics. 
Over this 30-year period, there were no surgical deaths due to events such as massive
hemorrhage or surgical mismanagement during anesthesia.”) (citations omitted); Myrna C.
Newland et al., Anesthetic-Related Cardiac Arrest and Its Mortality: A Report Covering 72,959
Anesthetics over 10 Years from a US Teaching Hospital, 97 ANESTHESIOLOGY 108, 108 (2002)
(“One hundred forty-four cases of cardiac arrest within 24 h of surgery were identified over a 10-
yr period from an anesthesia database of 72,959 anesthetics. . . . Fifteen cardiac arrests out of a
total number of 144 were judged to be related to anesthesia.  Five cardiac arrests were anesthesia-
attributable, resulting in an anesthesia-attributable cardiac arrest rate of 0.69 per 10,000
anesthetics . . . . Ten cardiac arrests were found to be anesthesia-contributory, resulting in an
anesthesia-contributory rate of 1.37 per 10.000 anesthetics . . . . The risk of death related to
anesthesia-attributable perioperative cardiac arrest was 0.55 per 10,000 anesthetics . . . .”).
139 See supra text accompanying notes 80, 85-87, 95, 104.
140 See, e.g., JOHN B. CHRISTIANSEN & SHARON N. BARNARTT, DEAF PRESIDENT NOW!:
THE 1988 REVOLUTION AT GALLAUDET UNIVERSITY, at vii, 160-63, 194 (1995); JACK R.
GANNON, THE WEEK THE WORLD HEARD GALLAUDET 15, 20, 144 (1989).
141 60 Minutes: King Jordan (CBS television broadcast, Mar. 11, 1990) (transcript at 14,
on file with author).  Oliver Markwirth, who has served as president of the Dallas County Deaf
Caucus, has similarly contended that: “‘Trying to make a deaf person hearing is like telling a
black person to change his skin . . . . Why do you want to make all people be the same?’” 
Christine Wicker, Sound Barrier: These Deaf People Are Flourishing with Their Own Culture,
Language and Humor.  And a Strong Bond in Their Isolation, DALLAS MORNING NEWS, Oct. 17,
1993, Magazine, at 8, 10.  Judith Coryell, who has been head of the deaf education program at
Western Maryland College, has also employed an analogy to race to describe the importance of
deafness to her identity.  “‘Let me put it this way,’” she has explained.  “‘Say you were black. 
Do you think you’d be considering surgery to make yourself white?’”  Marie Arana-Ward, As
Technology Advances, a Bitter Debate Divides the Deaf, WASH. POST, May 11, 1997, at A1,
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a mitigating medicine because of its cognitive side effects, when a reasonable person with that
impairment would be willing to take the medicine for its expected benefits.139
Similarly, even if one has doubts about the wisdom of a disabled person constructing a
disability-based identity for himself, the lives and public statements of a small number of
disabled people do reflect their commitment to such an identity.  These disabled people
frequently express the conviction that they would not change their disability if they could because
it is a significant part of who they are.  For instance, I. King Jordan, the president of Gallaudet
University, which is dedicated to deaf students,140 has denied that “there [is] a significant absence
when you can’t hear” and compared asking a deaf person if he would like to hear to “ask[ing] a
black person, ‘Suppose you could take a pill and become white, would you take it?’”141  Some
A20.  Along the same lines, Genie Gertz, who represented New York in a Miss Deaf America
contest, has reported that she “‘wouldn’t ever change [being deaf].  Why would I?’”  Andrew
Solomon, Defiantly Deaf, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 28, 1994, § 6 (Magazine), at 38, 45.  Clara Gantes, a
deaf teacher of sign language, has stated that she doesn’t “‘regret being deaf at all and I don’t
want to leave deaf people.  It’s a part of me.’”  John Barry, Silence Is Golden?, MIAMI HERALD,
Sept. 22, 1991, Tropic, at 8, 12, 16.  Susan Philip, who has been coordinator of deaf services at
Northeastern University, has said that: “‘My deafness is normal to me . . . . and I have no interest
in an implant.’”  Richard Saltus, Some Spurn Implants, Say They Don’t Want to Abandon the
Deaf Culture, BOSTON GLOBE, July 10, 1989, at 29, 29; see also BERNARD BRAGG, LESSONS IN
LAUGHTER: THE AUTOBIOGRAPHY OF A DEAF ACTOR 4 (Eugene Bergman trans., 1989) (“I
thought deafness was a way of life and never linked it with sickness, defectiveness, or a
handicapped condition.  I thought, and I still do, that my deafness is just part of who I am.”); J.
William Evans, Thoughts on the Psychosocial Implications of Cochlear Implantation in
Children, in COCHLEAR IMPLANTS IN YOUNG DEAF CHILDREN 307, 307-08 (Elmer Owens &
Dorcas K. Kessler eds., 1989) (“In an informal survey (Evans, unpublished raw data),
prelingually deafened adults were asked whether they would choose to have an implant if it were
possible that some hearing could be restored.  The response was approximately 85 percent
negative.  The common explanation they offered was that the procedure would be destructive to
their social relationships, to the world that they had come to know, and to their adaptive
mechanisms.”); Solomon, supra, at 40 (“‘I am black and Deaf and proud and I don’t want to be
white or hearing or different in any way from who I am.’” (quoting a student at the Lexington
Center for the Deaf)).
142 JOSEPH P. SHAPIRO, NO PITY: PEOPLE WITH DISABILITIES FORGING A NEW CIVIL
RIGHTS MOVEMENT 12, 14 (1993).  Nadina LaSpina, who also had polio, has similarly insisted
that she “‘would not trade my disability for anything . . . . We will not change to fit the mold . . . .
Instead, we will destroy the mold and change the world to make sure there is room for
everyone.’”  Douglas Martin, Disability Culture: Eager to Bite the Hands that Would Feed
Them, N.Y. TIMES, June 1, 1997, § 4, at 1, 1.  Gene Chelberg, who is blind, has campaigned for
the establishment of a cultural center for disabled students at the University of Minnesota by
recounting that: “‘For years, we have been asked to live in this able-bodied world, trying to
become able-bodied people.  The idea here is, I’m proud of my disability and I don’t need to be
fixed.’”  Cultural Center for the Disabled Prompts Debate, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 26, 1992, § 1, at
45, 45.  Steven E. Brown, a founder of the Institute on Disability Culture, has declared that: “‘We
claim our disabilities with pride as part of our identity.  We are who we are: we are people with
disabilities.’”  Martin, supra, at 1.
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disabled people outside the deaf community articulate similar beliefs.  Cyndi Jones, who had
polio, has stated that she would not take “a magic pill” that would allow her to walk again,
contending that this question is “‘the same thing as asking a black person would he change the
color of his skin.’”  “‘Even if you don’t like the way society treats you as a disabled person, it’s
part of your experience, it’s part of how you come to be who you are.’”142  Indeed, at least some
members of this group of disabled people, especially the deaf among them, report that they want
143 Saltus, supra note 141, at 29.
144 Deaf Parents Are Happy When Their Baby Is Born Deaf, ST. PETERSBURG TIMES, Oct.
11, 1994, at 3A, 3A.  Paula Sargent explains that “‘deaf people feel about deaf children the way
Indians feel about Indian children.  It’s like, ‘You’re part of us.’’”  Barry, supra note 141, at 13;
see also id. at 11 (“‘Actually, I wish there were more deaf babies being born,’ [sign language
teacher Lynn Frankel] types.  ‘That’s an awful thing to say if you don’t understand my position,
but to me a deaf child is a blessing, not a burden, and I am really proud of the fact that when God
was handing out handicaps, I was one of the chosen to get a handicap of deafness.’”); id. at 12
(“At Gallaudet’s genetic counseling center, couples come to find out how likely it is for deafness
to be passed on.  What is the ‘risk,’ some ask, of having hearing children?”); HARLAN LANE ET
AL., A JOURNEY INTO THE DEAF-WORLD 18 (1996) (“‘We were starting on my kids,’ said Henry. 
‘Like Jake’s folks, my wife and I weren’t expecting our children to be Deaf because we both
have hearing parents and the rest of our extended families are all hearing.  So it was a surprise to
us with both kids, but we were thrilled when we found out.  It was pretty confusing for the
doctors, let me tell you.  The audiologist came in after the test looking very apprehensive and
said, ‘I am so sorry.  The test shows that your baby is Deaf, although there may be a chance of
residual . . . .’  He stopped because my wife and I were hugging each other, we were so happy. 
He thought we were nuts.’”) (original emphasis omitted); Abigail Trafford, Controlling Genetic
Roulette, WASH. POST, Nov. 15, 1994, Health, at 6, 6 (“‘Many of our families are not interested
in fixing or curing deaf genes,’ explains genetic counselor Jamie Israel at the genetic services
center at Gallaudet.  ‘Many . . . couples come in and want . . . deaf children.’”); Wicker, supra
note 141, at 10 (“Ross Roeser, director of Dallas’ Callier Center for Communication Disorders,
gives an example he hopes will illuminate.  ‘You know, when we have two parents who are both
deaf,’ says Dr. Roeser, who is hearing, ‘and we test their baby and the baby turns out to be
hearing, they grieve, just like hearing parents who are told they have a child who is deaf.’”).
Not surprisingly, surveys consistently find that deaf people generally choose other deaf
people as marriage partners.  See, e.g., JEROME D. SCHEIN & MARCUS T. DELK, JR., THE DEAF
POPULATION OF THE UNITED STATES 1-2, 41 (1974) (“In choosing a marital partner, the majority
of deaf persons favor deaf partners.  Among married deaf persons in the current [national] survey
[of people deaf before age nineteen], most have deaf spouses . . . . The rate for nonwhite deaf
females is nearly the same as for white deaf females: a little over 14 percent having hearing
spouses.  The overall rates are close to those reported for New York State and Washington, D.C. 
Rainer et al. asked their deaf sample about preference for spouse’s hearing; 86 percent expressed
a desire for a deaf mate.”); John D. Rainer & W. Edwards Deming, Demographic Aspects:
Number, Distribution, Marriage and Fertility Statistics, in FAMILY AND MENTAL HEALTH
PROBLEMS IN A DEAF POPULATION 13, 13, 17 (John D. Rainer et al. eds., 2d ed. 1969) (“[In a
survey ‘of literate deaf persons,’] “only 5.1 per cent of women born deaf, and 8.7 per cent of
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their children to share their disability and the associated cultural identity.  Joan Philip Meehan,
for example, “‘want[ed] my daughter to be like me, to be deaf.’”143  Daniel Smith and his wife
“‘were very excited, happy [when their child was born deaf].  We were thrilled . . . . Doctors
thought it would be bad news — we had different perspectives.’”144
those that became deaf at an early age, were married to hearing men.  The rest had husbands who
had been deaf since birth or early childhood.  Almost 30 per cent of the marriages where both
partners were born deaf, and from 14 to 21 per cent of those where only one partner was born
deaf, resulted in deaf children, usually more than one.”).
145 This has historically been a crucial marker of the importance of religious identity, for
instance.  See, e.g., Donald A. Erickson, Showdown at an Amish Schoolhouse, in COMPULSORY
EDUCATION AND THE AMISH: THE RIGHT NOT TO BE MODERN 43, 43-48 (Albert N. Keim ed.,
1975) (describing organized Amish resistance to efforts to enforce compulsory schooling laws by
removing Amish children from schools run by the Amish).
146 See CHRISTIANSEN & BARNARTT, supra note 140, at vii-viii, 158-63; GANNON, supra
note 140, at 15, 48, 50, 144.
147 See CHRISTIANSEN & BARNARTT, supra note 140, at 133, 150-51, 156, 184-85;
GANNON, supra note 140, at 37-38, 94, 109.
148 See CHRISTIANSEN & BARNARTT, supra note 140, at vii-viii, 60, 79-81, 94, 96, 100,
102-04, 129, 133; GANNON, supra note 140, at 15, 109.  Inspired by the successful “Deaf
President Now” campaign at Gallaudet, a group of deaf students and alumni from the Lexington
Center for the Deaf in New York City organized a series of demonstrations in April and May of
1994 that led to the resignation of the center’s hearing chief executive officer and the
appointment of Phil Bravin, a leading figure in the deaf community, as president of the center’s
board.  Solomon, supra note 141, at 40, 42-43; see also David Firestone, Chief Executive to Step
down at Deaf Center, N.Y. TIMES, June 22, 1994, at B3, B3; David Firestone, Deaf Students
Protest New School Head, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 27, 1994, at B3, B3.  Students at the Wisconsin
School for the Deaf closed the school down for two days in November 1991 until the state agreed
to formulate a plan to recruit deaf people for staff positions at the school and to search for a deaf
person to serve as the school’s next superintendent.  See Richard L. Kenyon, Sign It Loud: I’m
Deaf, and I’m Proud, MILWAUKEE J., Apr. 5, 1992, Magazine, at 4, 7.
The broader disability culture movement, in turn, has orchestrated repeated, nationwide
protests of the annual Jerry Lewis Muscular Dystrophy Association Telethon, charging that “its
pity approach to fund-raising” contributes to the view that disabled people are “childlike,
helpless, hopeless, nonfunctioning and noncontributing members of society,” Evan Kemp Jr.,
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In addition, this category of disabled people has a record of organized resistance to
protect their disability-based cultural identity.145  In March 1988, for instance, deaf students at
Gallaudet University in Washington, D.C. succeeded in closing the school for a week until the
Board of Trustees agreed to appoint the university’s first deaf president, I. King Jordan.146  The
students, joined by thousands of deaf supporters from around the country who staged rallies in
their hometowns and who traveled to Washington to participate in marches,147 protested that the
hearing person that the trustees had initially chosen as president was not fluent in sign language
and did not understand deaf culture.148  The social life of this category of disabled people also
Aiding the Disabled: No Pity, Please, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 3, 1981, at A19, A19, “‘only worthwhile
if we can be cured,’” Greg Lopez, Disabilities Don’t Cripple Life, Woman Says, ROCKY MTN.
NEWS, Sept. 6, 1993, at 5A, 5A (quoting the organizers of “the first demonstration in Denver
against the telethon”); see also Alexandra M. Biesada, Protesters Object to ‘Jerry’s Kid’ Image,
AUSTIN AM.-STATESMAN, Sept. 7, 1993, at B2, B2; Katy Butler, Jerry Lewis Telethon Protested
in Oakland, S.F. CHRON., Sept. 7, 1992, at A11, A11; Peter Larsen, Annual Telethon Protested:
Disabled Call Lewis’ Style Demeaning, DAILY NEWS (Los Angeles), Sept. 7, 1992, at 4–News,
4–News; Holly Yettick, Protesters Arrested at Telethon, ROCKY MTN. NEWS, Sept. 4, 2001, at
17A, 17A.  This movement has also held demonstrations that denounce efforts to legalize
assisted suicide, arguing that the right-to-die movement is “‘promulgating the view that disability
is inherently undignified’” so “that someone who has become disabled might want to have
assisted suicide as an option.”  Jeanne Malmgren, Promoting Living Despite Disability, ST.
PETERSBURG TIMES, May 25, 1999, at 1D, 6D (quoting Diane Coleman, “spokeswoman for Not
Dead Yet”).
149 One deaf woman, for instance, has explained that her deaf social club in Philadelphia
“‘is like [her] home.’”  As she elaborated, “‘for Deaf people the Deaf club is like a second home. 
Hearing people don’t have anything like that.  They go home from work, put on headphones, and
listen to their stereos or watch television.  But the Deaf get together and socialize at their club. 
It’s like a second home.’”  Stephanie A. Hall, Door into Deaf Culture: Folklore in an American
Deaf Social Club, 73 SIGN LANGUAGE STUD. 421, 421 (1991).  “‘The deaf club,’” another deaf
person has similarly reported, is “‘where the deaf meet.  It’s their gathering place, the heart of
their world, their ballroom, their bar, their theater, their community center—all rolled into one.’” 
BRAGG, supra note 141, at 190-91 (quoting Gene Bergman, coauthor of the deaf play Tales from
a Clubroom); see also LOU ANN WALKER, A LOSS FOR WORDS: THE STORY OF DEAFNESS IN A
FAMILY 117-18 (1986) (“The network of organizations Mom and Dad belonged to entailed every
conceivable social, intellectual, and athletic function.  Obviously, because the deaf population is
limited, many of the clubs in Indianapolis had overlapping memberships, but still, the
commitment of those members was amazing. . . . The clubs held dances, had basketball and
softball leagues, dinners, endless parties and get-togethers.  One or several of these groups
sponsored nursing homes and children’s camps, provided scholarships, crowned a Miss Deaf
Indiana, and much, much more.”).
150 See, e.g., Lynette Clemetson, An International Gathering for the Deaf in the Arts, N.Y.
TIMES, July 8, 2002, at B1, B1 (“[Willy] Conley, now an actor, playwright and director, is one of
400 artists — visual, performing and literary — whose works are being featured in Deaf Way II,
an international arts festival and conference that begins today in Washington. . . . The weeklong
extravaganza is said to be the largest event in any country devoted to deaf issues and the arts.
More than 8,500 people from 108 countries have registered, and organizers are expecting
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frequently revolves around cultural institutions focused on a disability-based identity.  Many deaf
people, for example, have devoted significant portions of their lives to deaf clubs.149  There are
also deaf arts festivals,150 deaf film festivals,151 deaf beauty pageants,152 deaf theater companies,153
hundreds more.”); id. at B5 (“[Gallaudet] university convened the first Deaf Way conference in
1989, planning for 500 people.  More than 5,000 showed up.”).
151 See, e.g., John Petrakis, Cinema Scoping: A Look at the Local Fests for Nearly Every
Interest, CHI. TRIB., Feb. 22, 2002, § 7A, at 8, 8 (“[The goal of the Festival of Cinema for the
Deaf] is to show movies made by or starring deaf artists, while also presenting documentaries or
fiction films about the deaf experience.”).
152 See, e.g., Ray Quintanilla, Beauty Queen Really Signs on with Kids: Deafness Is Not a
Disability, Says Former Miss Deaf America Winner, CHI. TRIB., Sept. 23, 1994, § 2, at 1, 1
(“Stephanie Long, 24, . . . just completed a two-year stint as Miss Deaf America . . . . [T]here
will always be a Miss Deaf America, Long said, referring to the pageant that’s in its 20th year.”);
id. at 1, 8 (“Long told the Parkwood pupils not to look upon deafness as a disability. . . . ‘The
only difference between deaf people and everyone else is that deaf people can’t hear,’ Long said. 
‘Don’t think of your difference as a weakness,’ she said.”).
153 See, e.g., HELEN POWERS, SIGNS OF SILENCE: BERNARD BRAGG AND THE NATIONAL
THEATRE OF THE DEAF 115-16 (1972) (describing the founding of the National Theatre of the
Deaf, “the first professional theater made up of deaf performers”); BRAGG, supra note 141, at
111, 116-17 (same); id. at 191 (describing “the Hughes Memorial Theatre, Washington’s
longtime community theater of the deaf”).
154 See, e.g., BERNARD BRAGG & EUGENE BERGMAN, TALES FROM A CLUBROOM, at xii
(1981) (“It is a fact and not puffery that this play, written by the deaf for the deaf, has met with
enthusiastic responses from deaf audiences wherever it was performed.  So there must be
something genuine about it—something with which the deaf can identify—and that was our aim
in the first place. . . . As we see it, and as we know other deaf people see it, our play reflects the
vibrant and buoyant life of a close-knit community.”); GILBERT C. EASTMAN, SIGN ME ALICE, at
xi (1974) (“In past years the Gallaudet College Theatre has presented classic or contemporary
plays in which the principal characters (antagonists and protagonists) express their ideas,
arguments, and feelings in speeches that must be translated, and we the deaf don’t fully live the
parts because they portray the life of the hearing.  Sign Me Alice is about the life of the deaf
mingling in the world of the hearing.  The heroine does not ask for pity but for the right to the
deaf’s choice: sign language or any of the artificial languages that use signs to represent
English.”).
155 See, e.g., Mike Ervin, The History of Bowling (Oct. 2000) (unpublished manuscript,
on file with author); Cheryl Marie Wade, Sassy Girl: Memoirs of a Poster Child Gone Awry
(1994) (unpublished manuscript, on file with author); Carrie Sandahl, 7 Plays About Physical
Difference: Facets of the Experience of Disability from the Insiders’ Perspective, AM. THEATRE,
Apr. 2001, at 21, 22 (“A growing number of playwrights and performance artists have given
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and deaf plays.154  The broader disability culture movement has similarly produced plays,155
artistic expression to the experiences and culture of disability from an insider’s perspective. . . .
[T]hese insider plays consistently challenge notions of physical impairment as a metaphor for
evil, sin, helplessness and psychological trauma or, conversely, innocence and saintliness. . . . In
addition, the characters in these plays cannot be ‘reduced’ to their impairments . . . . Unlike those
portrayed in TV movies-of-the-week or mainstream films, these characters are not obsessed with
‘overcoming’ or ‘curing’ their conditions, but take their bodies as givens, exploring the
intersection between their subjective and complex experiences of disability and the larger
culture’s often objectifying and limiting perceptions.”).
156 See, e.g., Greg Freeman, Readers Offer Their Favorite “Uniquities” – What’s Special
About Living in St. Louis Area, ST. LOUIS POST-DISPATCH, Jan. 28, 2001, at C3, C3 (“‘The
DisAbility Project [is] a project of That Uppity Theatre Company.  An ensemble of disabled and
nondisabled adults who range in age from 18-70, we create, perform and tour innovative, original
theatrical material about the culture of disability.’” (quoting Joan Lipkin)); Kathleen Tolan, We
Are Not a Metaphor: A Conversation About Representation, AM. THEATRE, Apr. 2001, at 16, 17-
18 (“[T]he disability rights movement and ‘crip culture’ are challenging our preconceptions
about what it is to be human. . . . Working both inside and outside traditional theatre institutions,
the disability community has nurtured a body of work devoted to the disability experience.  The
longest-lived disability-specific group is Brother Rick Curry’s National Theatre Workshop for
the Handicapped, which has been in existence since 1977 and has campuses in Maine and New
York City.  NTWH offers professional training and performance opportunities to artists with
disabilities.  Other companies have explicitly activist aims: to empower people with disabilities
to take control of their own stories and their own images through performance.  Joan Lipkin’s
DisAbility Project in St. Louis and Wry Crips, a disabled women’s theatre collective in the Bay
area, . . . are two such groups.”).
157 See, e.g., Kenny Fries, Introduction, in STARING BACK: THE DISABILITY EXPERIENCE
FROM THE INSIDE OUT 1, 9 (Kenny Fries ed., 1997) (“In 1994, I was invited to and participated in
the historic ‘A Contemporary Chautauqua: Disability and Performance,’ organized by Victoria
Ann-Lewis, director of Other Voices, at the Mark Taper Forum in Los Angeles.  That April
weekend, prominent artists with disabilities gathered from all across the United States to
perform, read, teach, learn, talk, and get to know one another.  That we had something valuable
to offer was evidenced not only by an audience hungry to share our work, not only by the
overcrowded classes, the sold-out performances, the TV camera crews from CNN and WNET,
but also by the lasting nurturing relationships forged by many of the participant artists.”).
158 See, e.g., Neal Karlen, No Ordinary Inspirational ‘Cripple Story,’ N.Y. TIMES, Nov.
26, 1995, § 2, at 20, 20 (“‘When Billy Broke His Head’ is more a disabled version of ‘On the
Road,’ with [Billy] Golfus as Jack Kerouac’s Sal Paradise.  Beginning at a fiery disability-rights
demonstration in Chicago, he wends his way to California and back to Minnesota to visit the
blind, the bent and the paralyzed, people trying to get by amid social stigmas and government
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theater companies,156 performing arts festivals,157 films,158 film festivals,159 and cultural centers in
neglect.  Also woven into the narrative are what he sees as patronizing images of the disabled:
Jerry Lewis crooning to wheelchair-bound children at a Labor Day telethon, Lon Chaney eating
the scenery in ‘The Hunchback of Notre Dame.’”).
159 See, e.g., Elizabeth Lenhard, Disability Film Fest Tries to Even Playing Field,
ATLANTA CONST., Aug. 14, 1996, at D2, D2 (“Miramar’s Disability Film Festival, created at the
behest of the Third Paralympic Congress, won’t look back at cinema’s bitter paraplegics and
blind damsels in distress.  Instead, it will introduce dozens of new films — everything from slick,
feature-length documentaries bound for television networks to rough-edged two-minute shorts to
public service announcements — that affirm the disability experience and reveal corners of the
culture.”).
160 See, e.g., Meg McSherry Breslin, Anna Stonum, 40, Activist for Disabled, CHI. TRIB.,
Feb. 13, 1999, § 1, at 23, 23 (discussing “the Disability Arts and Culture Center at the University
of Illinois”); Dianne B. Piastro, Rejecting the Role of the Victim, PLAIN DEALER (Cleveland),
July 13, 1993, at 9E, 9E (“As more and more disabled people discard the roles of isolated
victims, and reflect pride in their shared experience, disability culture will simply become
accepted as an integral part of the cultural diversity of this country.  Toward this goal, an exciting
gathering of student leaders with disabilities from college campuses around the country is being
convened . . . . Hosted by the Disabled Student Cultural Center at the University of Minnesota,
this precedent-setting conference will explore disability culture and pride.”); supra note 142.
161 See, e.g., McDonnell v. McPartlin, 708 N.E.2d 412, 420 (Ill. App. Ct. 1999) (“Illinois
law is clear: a plaintiff has no duty to mitigate his damages by submitting to serious or major
surgery.”); Hall v. Dumitru, 620 N.E.2d 668, 673 (Ill. App. Ct. 1993) (“[T]he rule regarding
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universities.160
In each of these two categories of cases, reasonable mitigation would require plaintiffs to
make particularly large sacrifices, at least from the plaintiff’s own perspective.  Nonetheless, I
would still apply the duty of reasonable mitigation to these difficult cases.  The same arguments
for imposing a duty to mitigate on other plaintiffs seeking the protection of Title I’s reasonable
accommodation provision hold here as well.  The employers or prospective employers of the
plaintiffs in the two difficult categories of cases have a legitimate interest in minimizing the costs
associated with accommodation if mitigation is possible and reasonable for the plaintiffs to
undertake.  These plaintiffs should also not be able to avail themselves of Title I’s reasonable
accommodation provision because they have chosen not to mitigate when mitigation would be
reasonable.
Moreover, creating a separate standard, outside of the reasonable mitigation standard, to
govern these two difficult categories of cases would produce endless disputes and an extensive
collateral jurisprudence about when each of the two standards should apply.  Some tort cases, for
example, hold that a plaintiff disabled by tort need not mitigate when the associated risks or side
effects are particularly serious, even if a reasonable person in the same situation would
mitigate.161  This jurisprudence quickly demonstrates, however, that there is no obvious or widely
mitigation of damages in relation to suggested medical treatment is as follows: A patient has a
duty to submit to reasonable medical care and treatment intended to improve the patient’s
condition and reduce or eliminate the consequences of the defendant’s tortious act. . . . An
exception to this general rule exists with respect to surgical procedures as well as nonsurgical
procedures which present a risk of enhanced or additional injury.”).
162 Couture v. Novotny, 211 N.W.2d 172, 174-75 (Minn. 1973).
163 Id. at 176; see also id. (“We . . . direct that the following instruction, at least in
substance, be used in this case: If you find that the injuries suffered by Couture can be alleviated
by a surgical operation and that a reasonably prudent person would undergo such an operation,
under all of the circumstances in this case, then such a finding should be taken into consideration
by you as a factor which would reduce the amount of damages to which Couture would otherwise
be entitled.”).
164 See supra text accompanying notes 134-137.
165 For some leading examples from the extensive debate over the relative advantages of
rules and standards, see FREDERICK SCHAUER, PLAYING BY THE RULES: A PHILOSOPHICAL
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accepted way to judge when risks or side effects are particularly serious.  Minnesota, for instance,
originally exempted people disabled by torts from a duty of reasonable mitigation if the
mitigation involved “a major surgical operation.”162  But the state supreme court dropped this
exception in 1973, after recognizing “that the term ‘major surgery’ as used in [the state’s jury]
instruction [was] too indefinite.”163  The judiciary has even less expertise or experience in
determining whether a disability is central to a plaintiff’s cultural identity.
Yet these two hard categories of cases do suggest that courts need to proceed carefully
before deciding that a Title I plaintiff’s decision not to mitigate is unreasonable.  As noted above,
for example, empirical evidence about what other disabled people in the same situation have
done should be relevant in judging reasonableness.  It gives fact-finders a solid foundation from
which to work in deciding hard cases.  The greater the percentage of disabled people in the
plaintiff’s situation who have mitigated, the more likely it is that mitigation is the only
reasonable choice.164  At the same time, decisions by a majority of people in the same situation to
mitigate do not always mean that the people who have made the other choice are unreasonable. 
In some situations, the sacrifice that mitigation would demand from a plaintiff may be great
enough, or the costs and benefits of mitigation so closely matched, that decisions both in favor
and against mitigation are reasonable, even though a majority of people in the situation choose to
mitigate.  Courts, accordingly, should not automatically and mechanically equate reasonableness
with majority rule.  Instead, courts should appraise the reasonableness of a plaintiff’s decision
against mitigation carefully, considering to the extent possible why people in the plaintiff’s
situation have or have not mitigated and not just how many people have made each choice.  This
somewhat more flexible approach could do much more to recognize plaintiffs’ legitimate
interests, justifying its somewhat higher demands on fact-finders.165  In this way, courts applying
EXAMINATION OF RULE-BASED DECISION-MAKING IN LAW AND IN LIFE 104 & n.35 (1991); Louis
Kaplow, Rules Versus Standards: An Economic Analysis, 42 DUKE L.J. 557, 559-68 (1992);
Duncan Kennedy, Form and Substance in Private Law Adjudication, 89 HARV. L. REV. 1685,
1685-1713 (1976); Pierre Schlag, Rules and Standards, 33 UCLA L. REV. 379, 379-90 (1985);
Kathleen M. Sullivan, The Supreme Court, 1991 Term—Foreword: The Justices of Rules and
Standards, 106 HARV. L. REV. 22, 56-95 (1992).
166 See Sutton v. United Air Lines, Inc., 527 U.S. 471, 488 (1999).
167 See id. at 489; see also Murphy v. United Parcel Serv., Inc., 527 U.S. 516, 521-22
(1999).
168 42 U.S.C. §§ 12111(8), 12112(a) (2000).
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a reasonable mitigation standard in Title I suits can appropriately adjudicate and resolve both the
vast bulk of cases in which the plaintiff has not mitigated, and two particularly difficult
categories of cases as well.
III. PROTECTION FOR PEOPLE WHO HAVE MITIGATED
The case for imposing a duty to mitigate on plaintiffs seeking the protection of Title I’s
reasonable accommodation provision does not depend on whether Sutton’s rulings about the
status of plaintiffs who have mitigated remain in force or are legislatively overridden.  But this
Part briefly reexamines the legal rights of mitigators in light of the proposed duty of reasonable
mitigation.  Under Sutton, only two groups of mitigators are protected under Title I.  The first
group consists of mitigators who are still substantially limited in a major life activity after
mitigating.  They count as “disabled” people under Sutton.166  The second group consists of
mitigators who are not substantially limited after mitigation, but who suffer an adverse
employment action because an employer thinks that they have an impairment that substantially
limits a major life activity.  These plaintiffs count as “regarded as” disabled people under
Sutton.167  Both of these groups of mitigators merit Title I protection.  The plaintiffs in the first
situation have complied with the duty to mitigate, yet remain disabled and in potential need of
accommodation, and the employers’ intentions and motivations in the second situation are
exactly the sort that Title I seeks to regulate.  This Part argues, however, that Sutton’s definition
of “regarded as” disabled persons should be expanded to include two more classes of mitigators
who are not substantially limited after mitigation: people who suffer an adverse employment
action because they had to mitigate and people who suffer an adverse employment action because
of the (non-substantially-limiting) side effects of the mitigation.
Identifying these two classes of mitigators as people who are “regarded as” disabled
would protect them from intentional discrimination.  Stated more precisely, it would mean that if
these mitigators “can perform the essential functions of the employment position,” they cannot
legally be denied a job because they had to mitigate or because they have non-substantially-
limiting side effects from mitigation.168  This protection would advance what Title I recognizes as
169 For decisions holding that Title I plaintiffs who are “regarded as” disabled are not
entitled to reasonable accommodations, see cases cited infra note 170.  For decisions holding or
suggesting that Title I plaintiffs who are “regarded as” disabled are entitled to reasonable
accommodations, see Katz v. City Metal Co., 87 F.3d 26, 33 (1st Cir. 1996) (concluding that
whether “regarded as” disabled plaintiff could have performed his job with reasonable
accommodations was an issue for the jury); Jacques v. DiMarzio, Inc., 200 F. Supp. 2d 151, 163,
166 (E.D.N.Y. 2002) (“The Court disagrees with Weber and all the other courts that have held
that reasonable accommodations should not be available where a plaintiff is ‘regarded as’
disabled.  The Court’s conclusion is driven by a number of considerations: (1) the plain language
of the ADA; (2) the legislative history behind the ‘regarded as’ prong; (3) the mandatory
interactive process, as referenced in Jewell, and (4) the Court’s critiques of Weber’s underlying
rationale.”).  For decisions leaving the issue of whether Title I plaintiffs who are “regarded as”
disabled are entitled to reasonable accommodations explicitly undecided, see Buskirk v. Apollo
Metals, 307 F.3d 160, 168-69 (3d Cir. 2002) (“[T]he courts of appeals are divided as to whether
the employer is obliged to provide reasonable accommodations to a ‘regarded as’ plaintiff, and
we have not answered the question directly.  Once again, we will reserve the answer to this
question for a future case . . . .”) (footnote omitted); Taylor v. Pathmark Stores, Inc., 177 F.3d
180, 195-96 (3rd Cir. 1999) (“If Taylor prevails, the District Court might have to decide in the
first instance whether a ‘regarded as’ plaintiff is entitled to accommodation even though he is not
disabled.  We have yet to resolve this issue.  On the one hand, the statute does not appear to
distinguish between disabled and ‘regarded as’ individuals in requiring accommodation.  On the
other, it seems odd to give an impaired but not disabled person a windfall because of her
employer’s erroneous perception of disability, when other impaired but not disabled people are
not entitled to accommodation.”); Deane v. Pocono Med. Ctr., 142 F.3d 138, 148 n.12 (3d Cir.
1998) (en banc) (“[W]e need not reach the more difficult question addressed by the panel
whether ‘regarded as’ disabled plaintiffs must be accommodated by their employers if they
cannot perform the essential functions of their jobs.”).
170 See Kaplan v. City of North Las Vegas, 323 F.3d 1226, 1232-33 (9th Cir. 2003) (“If
we were to conclude that ‘regarded as’ plaintiffs are entitled to reasonable accommodation,
impaired employees would be better off under the statute if their employers treated them as
disabled even if they were not.  This would be a perverse and troubling result under a statute
aimed at decreasing ‘stereotypic assumptions not truly indicative of the individual ability of
[people with disabilities].’ . . . To require accommodation for those not truly disabled would
[also] compel employers to waste resources unnecessarily, when the employers’ limited
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legitimate interests, while infringing upon none of the legitimate interests of employers.  These
plaintiffs should be considered “regarded as” disabled rather than disabled people, however,
because they no longer have actual substantial limitations.  For the same reason, they should not
have a right to reasonable accommodation.  The case law is currently divided on whether
“regarded as” disabled plaintiffs are entitled to reasonable accommodation.169  But the majority of
courts that have found no accommodation right for “regarded as” disabled plaintiffs have the
better argument.170  Although Title I’s text does not indicate that “regarded as” disabled people
resources would be better spent assisting those persons who are actually disabled and in genuine
need of accommodation to perform to their potential. . . . [W]e hold that there is no duty to
accommodate an employee in an ‘as regarded’ case.”) (citation omitted); Weber v. Strippit, Inc.,
186 F.3d 907, 916-17 (8th Cir. 1999) (“Imposing liability on employers who fail to accommodate
non-disabled employees who are simply regarded as disabled would lead to bizarre results. . . .
The ADA cannot reasonably have been intended to create a disparity in treatment among
impaired but non-disabled employees, denying most the right to reasonable accommodations but
granting to others, because of their employers’ misperceptions, a right to reasonable
accommodations no more limited than those afforded actually disabled employees.  Accordingly,
we hold that ‘regarded as’ disabled plaintiffs are not entitled to reasonable accommodations
. . . .”); Workman v. Frito-Lay, Inc., 165 F.3d 460, 467 (6th Cir. 1999) (“Under the third prong,
‘regarded as’ having a disability, the defendant correctly contends that a finding on this basis
would obviate the Company’s obligation to reasonably accommodate Workman.”); Newberry v.
E. Tex. State Univ., 161 F.3d 276, 280 (5th Cir. 1998) (“[A]n employer need not provide
reasonable accommodation to an employee who does not suffer from a substantially limiting
impairment merely because the employer thinks the employee has such an impairment.”).
171 See supra text accompanying notes 46-47.
172 See supra text accompanying note 167.
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are to be treated differently than disabled people, the motivating logic behind the reasonable
accommodation provision is that accommodations are a way of restructuring jobs to take account
of a person’s substantial limitations.  People without actual substantial limitations have no need
for reasonable accommodations.  People who are discriminated against because they had to
mitigate or because of the non-substantially-limiting side effects of the mitigation do, however,
have a strong case for protection from intentional discrimination.  Consider each of these two
classes of mitigators in turn.
Begin with the situation of a plaintiff who is no longer substantially limited after
mitigating, but is denied employment because he had to mitigate.  The myopic Sutton plaintiffs
fit into this category.  Their eyesight was no longer substantially limited when they wore
corrective lenses, but United Airlines would not hire them because they needed to mitigate by
wearing the lenses.171  Another potential example might involve a manic depressive who is no
longer substantially limited when he takes lithium, but is denied employment because he needs to
mitigate by consuming the lithium.
It would be impossible to predict all of the reasons why an employer might refuse to hire
this class of job applicants because they had to mitigate, but four possibilities are apparent.  First,
an employer may harbor something like pure prejudice against disabled people or people that the
employer associates with disability.  An employer may fear or loathe people with manic
depression, for instance, no matter what they do to mitigate.  Second, an employer may have
unfounded doubts about the effectiveness of an applicant’s mitigation.  The employer may not
actually think that the applicant remains substantially limited, which would allow the applicant to
be protected under Sutton’s narrow definition of “regarded as” disabled.172  But the employer may
173 See, e.g., 42 U.S.C. §§ 12101, 12112(a).
174 Id. §§ 12111(8), 12112(a).
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be convinced without reason that the applicant has some lesser, yet still disqualifying, limitation. 
For example, an employer may not believe how effective lithium is at controlling manic
depression, or how much corrective lenses can improve someone’s ability to see.  Third, an
employer may not trust the applicant to continue to mitigate, in circumstances where mitigation
requires efforts that are ongoing (like the daily consumption of medicine or the daily use of
corrective lenses) rather than singular (like surgery).  If the applicant decides to stop mitigating,
and thereby fails to satisfy his duty of reasonable mitigation, he would no longer be protected
under Title I and could legitimately be denied employment.  But the employer may believe that
this is inadequate protection with respect to a particular job or applicant.  For instance, United
Airlines might not want to hire manic depressive pilots who mitigate with lithium because of the
importance of airplane safety and the risk that the airline will not be able to detect immediately
whether the pilots have decided to stop taking lithium.  Fourth, an employer may fear that a
presently effective mitigating measure will fail at an inopportune moment for reasons beyond the
applicant’s control.  United Airlines, for example, might believe that the Sutton plaintiffs have no
substantial limitations when they wear corrective lenses, but worry that the plaintiffs’ lenses
could be lost or broken in an emergency.
An employer’s first two possible reasons for refusing to hire an applicant because he had
to mitigate would be prohibited if the applicant was protected as a “regarded as” disabled person. 
But an employer has no legitimate interest under Title I in taking adverse employment actions for
those reasons, and including the applicant in these situations within the protection of Title I
would advance legitimate interests under the statute.  First, employers have no legitimate interest
under Title I in acting out of pure animus toward disability.  Indeed, one of Title I’s goals is to
combat fear and loathing of the disabled.173  Second, employers have no legitimate interest under
Title I in acting on baseless doubts about whether mitigation can be effective.  To the contrary,
one of the core premises behind imposing a duty to mitigate has to be the conviction that
mitigation can materially lessen or eliminate disabilities in some situations.
Moreover, recognizing plaintiffs who are discriminated against because they had to
mitigate as “regarded as” disabled people would still protect the legitimate interests of
employers.  As a preliminary matter, an employer’s legitimate interest in minimizing the cost that
can be associated with providing accommodations is not at stake here.  These plaintiffs no longer
need accommodation because they have complied with the duty to mitigate.  In addition,
employers would remain free to refuse employment to people who actually cannot perform a job
because they had to mitigate.  Recall that Title I defines the “qualified” people who are entitled to
protection from intentional employment discrimination as people who “can perform the essential
functions of the employment position.”174  In most cases, the fact that an applicant has mitigated
will not prevent her from performing the essential functions of a job.  The fact that a myopic
person depends on corrective lenses that may break, for instance, does not plausibly disqualify
that person from office work because the lenses can be easily replaced with little disruption for
the employer.  But in some cases the fact of mitigation will make someone unable to perform the
175 See, e.g., Andrews v. Ohio, 104 F.3d 803, 810 (6th Cir. 1997) (“The allegations, which
we take as true, establish only that the officers have certain physical characteristics either being
marginally above a weight limit or marginally below a fitness standard which Ohio has deemed
inconsistent with the job requirements of certain law enforcement positions. . . . We thus find
that Ohio is entitled to its motion to dismiss.”); Murray v. John D. Archbold Mem’l Hosp., Inc.,
50 F. Supp. 2d 1368, 1378 (M.D. Ga. 1999) (“Exceeding the boundaries of Defendants’ weight
policy is no disability at all because the policy drew the line at figures which would exceed the
maximum desirable weight of large-framed men and women plus 30% of that weight, figures that
are well below the measures for morbid obesity.”).
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essential functions of the job, and an employer would then be free to deny the applicant work for
that reason.  Myopic pilots who mitigate with corrective lenses or manic depressive pilots who
mitigate with lithium, for instance, might very well be unable to establish that they can perform
the essential functions of a pilot’s job, given the importance that job places on maintaining
extremely high safety levels and constant preparedness.
Turn to the situation of a plaintiff who is no longer substantially limited in any major life
activity after mitigating, but is denied employment because of a non-substantially-limiting side
effect of the mitigation.  Imagine, for example, a job applicant who mitigates her disability by
taking a medicine that leaves her with no substantial limitations, but has the side effect of
producing a modest weight gain (which is not, of course, considered a disability itself).175  An
employer refuses to hire the applicant because of her weight gain, although it does not believe
that the applicant is substantially limited in a major life activity.
Here, too, protecting this applicant as a “regarded as” disabled person would advance
legitimate interests under the statute.  Suppose, for instance, that the employer has refused to hire
the job applicant with a side effect of modest weight gain because the employer simply dislikes
overweight people.  Title I is not concerned about protecting the modestly overweight in general,
but this job applicant’s weight gain is tied to what the duty to mitigate recognizes as important
interests under the statute.  One of the premises of a duty of reasonable mitigation is that side
effects can be an inherent part of mitigation that is worth undertaking.  This duty would require a
job applicant to assume side effects, as long as they are side effects that a reasonable person in
the same situation would assume.  Denying this applicant Title I protection can function in a way
that treats the benefits of mitigation and the associated side effects as separate phenomenon,
leaving the applicant vulnerable to adverse employment decisions based on those side effects. 
Protecting a job applicant or employee from employment discrimination based on the side effects
of mitigation, like weight gain, would recognize that these side effects are inextricably linked to
the fact that the person is mitigating, and the fact that she is mitigating is inextricably linked to
both the substantial personal benefits of mitigation and the duty to mitigate that I advocate
imposing.
An employer’s legitimate interests are safeguarded, moreover.  An employer is not
required to provide someone who has non-substantially-limiting side effects with reasonable
accommodations, even if the person counts as “regarded as” disabled, and an employer has to
hire only those people who can perform the essential functions of the job.  In most cases, a
modest weight gain will not disqualify someone from performing a job, but in some cases it
176 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2 (2000).
177 See supra text accompanying notes 58-59.
178 See supra text accompanying note 26.
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might.  So, for instance, a fashion company would still be able to refuse modeling work to an
applicant with a modest weight gain if that weight gain made the applicant unqualified for
modeling work.  A factory would still be able to refuse work as a machine operator to an
applicant with a modest weight gain if that weight gain made the applicant unable to operate the
factory’s machines at the required rate.  Classifying plaintiffs who are discriminated against
because they had to mitigate or because they have non-substantially-limiting side effects from
mitigation as “regarded as” disabled persons would advance legitimate interests under Title I,
without infringing upon the legitimate interests of employers.
IV. THE DUTY TO MITIGATE AND AN IMPORTANT DIFFERENCE BETWEEN TITLE I AND TITLE
VII
Thus far, I have considered the case for imposing a duty of reasonable mitigation on
people seeking the protection of Title I’s accommodation provision, and examined the rights of
mitigators in light of that duty.  This final Part of the Article uses the duty to mitigate issue to
illuminate an important difference between Title I’s accommodation provision and the
prohibition on intentional discrimination in Title VII of the 1964 Civil Rights Act, which bans
employment discrimination based on “race, color, religion, sex, or national origin.”176  It argues
that Title VII should not require mitigation.  In some contexts, as with Title I’s reasonable
accommodation provision, imposing a duty to mitigate can serve legitimate interests under a
statute.  But placing a duty to mitigate on Title VII plaintiffs—which the Title VII jurisprudence
officially does not do but arguably might be doing indirectly—would not serve what Title VII
recognizes as legitimate interests.  Instead, it would allow employers to avoid costs that reflect
the very sort of prejudice that Title VII seeks to disestablish.
Title I’s reasonable accommodation provision and Title VII’s intentional discrimination
prohibition attach different moral or normative weight to the costs that they place on employers. 
As we have seen, Title I’s reasonable accommodation provision recognizes that employers have a
legitimate interest in minimizing the costs associated with providing accommodation, and this is
a powerful reason for imposing a duty to mitigate on people seeking accommodation under Title
I.177  In contrast, however, Title VII operates on the assumption that the costs placed on
employers who must hire regardless of race, color, religion, sex, and national origin give
employers no legitimate ground for complaint, because these costs reflect Title VII’s central
moral and normative goals.  Title VII may force employers to alienate prejudiced customers and
coworkers by adopting nondiscriminatory hiring policies,178 but the statute is meant to combat
rather than indulge that type of prejudice.  As one court deciding a sex discrimination claim
under Title VII noted, for example, “it would be totally anomalous if we were to allow the
preferences and prejudices of the customers to determine whether the sex discrimination was
179 Diaz v. Pan Am. World Airways, Inc., 442 F.2d 385, 389 (5th Cir. 1971).
180 See supra text accompanying note 27.
181 City of Los Angeles Dep’t of Water & Power v. Manhart, 435 U.S. 702, 708 (1978).
182 Id. at 709.
183 See supra text accompanying notes 29-32.  The congressmen who enacted Title VII’s
“BFOQ” exception explained that it would, for example, permit a Jewish congregation to hire
“Jewish cantors and rabbis,” 110 CONG. REC. 2559 (1964) (statement of Rep. Corman), “an
elderly woman” to hire “a female nurse,” id. at 2718 (statement of Rep. Goodell), and “a French
restaurant” to hire “a French cook,” id. at 7213 (“INTERPRETATIVE MEMORANDUM OF TITLE VII
OF H.R. 7152 SUBMITTED JOINTLY BY SENATOR JOSEPH S. CLARK AND SENATOR CLIFFORD P.
CASE, FLOOR MANAGERS”); see also id. at 2549 (statement of Rep. Rodino) (“[N]ational origin
in the operation of a specialty restaurant such as a French restaurant or Italian restaurant could
properly be an occupational qualification that is reasonably necessary to the operation of the
restaurant business.”); id. at 13,170 (statement of Sen. Byrd) (“[I]t would not constitute an
unlawful employment practice to hire a person of a particular religion, sex, or national origin in
those limited circumstances where religion, sex, or national origin is a bona fide occupational
qualification.  For example, an Italian chef could be employed for an Italian restaurant.”).
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valid.  Indeed, it was, to a large extent, these very prejudices the Act was meant to overcome.”179 
Similarly, Title VII may prohibit employers from acting based on statistically accurate
generalizations about a protected class,180 but the Title VII jurisprudence also identifies these
generalizations as a form of impermissible bias.  As the Supreme Court has explained, “[e]ven a
true generalization about the class is an insufficient reason for disqualifying an individual to
whom the generalization does not apply.”181  “[T]he basic policy of [Title VII] requires that we
focus on fairness to individuals rather than fairness to classes.  Practices that classify employees
in terms of religion, race, or sex tend to preserve traditional assumptions about groups rather than
thoughtful scrutiny of individuals.”182
Phrased another way, Title I’s reasonable accommodation provision recognizes that an
employer does have a legitimate reason to prefer an employee or job applicant who needs less
accommodation, or no accommodation.  But Title VII’s prohibition on intentional discrimination
operates on the premise that it is illegitimate for an employer to prefer an employee or job
applicant based on race, color, religion, sex, or national origin.  The only exception Title VII
makes is for those rare situations in which religion, sex, or national origin is a “bona fide
occupational qualification,” and this a very narrow exception that does not accept cost as a
permissible reason for refusing to employ a protected person.183
In this light, it is clear why Title VII plaintiffs should not be obligated to mitigate their
race, color, religion, sex, or national origin.  In the context of Title VII, mitigating a plaintiff’s
race, color, religion, sex, or national origin would mean respecting employer interests that the
statute understands to be illegitimate.  Indeed, the reasons for not imposing a duty to mitigate
184 See supra Part II.
185 See, e.g., Garcia v. Gloor, 618 F.2d 264, 270 n.6 (5th Cir. 1980) (“Religion is, of
course, a forbidden criterion [under Title VII], even though a matter of individual choice.”).
186 See, e.g., Wislocki-Goin v. Mears, 831 F.2d 1374, 1376-77, 1379 (7th Cir. 1987)
(holding that a requirement that employees conform to “the ‘Brooks Brothers look,’” by dressing
conservatively, wearing their hair up, and avoiding excessive makeup, is not an employment
requirement based on sex under Title VII); Smith v. Liberty Mut. Ins. Co., 569 F.2d 325, 326-27
(5th Cir. 1978) (holding that discrimination based on a male job applicant’s effeminacy is not
sex-based discrimination under Title VII); Willingham v. Macon Tel. Publ’g Co., 507 F.2d 1084,
1086-88, 1091-93 (5th Cir. 1975) (en banc) (holding that a rule prohibiting male employees from
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under Title VII are very similar to the reasons for not imposing a duty to mitigate on a Title I
plaintiff where mitigation could not decrease the plaintiff’s need for accommodation.  As
explained above, only mitigation that could diminish a Title I plaintiff’s accommodation
requirements could serve an employer’s legitimate interest under Title I in minimizing the cost of
the accommodations that the employer provides.184  Employers have no legitimate interest under
Title I in being able to discriminate against a disabled person because he is disabled, when the
disabled person can perform the job in question as it is currently structured without
accommodation.  Stated more generally, mitigation is only appropriate when it is serving
legitimate interests under the statute.  It is not appropriate when it would enable employers to
avoid costs that reflect the very sort of bias that the statute seeks to combat.
As a formal matter at least, Title VII conforms to this insight.  It officially imposes no
duty to mitigate on the plaintiffs seeking its protection.  To some extent, the absence of a duty to
mitigate under Title VII may simply reflect the difficulty of changing the characteristics that Title
VII protects: race, color, religion, sex, and national origin.  But this explanation is insufficient. 
Most notably, a person experiencing employment discrimination because of his religion could
change his religion by converting.185  If Title VII plaintiffs are not expected to convert, it is
presumably because doing so would mean respecting the religious prejudices that the statute is
designed to counter.
At the same time, aspects of Title VII’s jurisprudence may arguably be imposing a duty to
mitigate unofficially and as a matter of practice.  Indeed, a longstanding debate in the Title VII
case law and commentary can be usefully reconceived as a debate about mitigation and about
whether Title VII jurisprudence currently imposes a duty to mitigate.
At the moment, the debate about which employment policies should count as policies that
discriminate based on race, color, religion, sex, or national origin is framed around the question
of how Title VII’s protected classes are best defined.  Title VII itself does not specify what it
means by race, color, religion, sex, or national origin, and courts and commentators have
disputed which definitions are most appropriate.  For example, some courts contend that Title
VII’s prohibition on “sex” discrimination only reaches policies that penalize applicants or
employees because of their biological sex (i.e., because of the fact that the applicant or employee
is a woman or a man).186  Other courts and commentators insist that Title VII’s prohibition on
having long hair is not a sex-based rule under Title VII); Lanigan v. Bartlett & Co. Grain, 466 F.
Supp. 1388, 1389-92 (W.D. Mo. 1979) (holding that a rule prohibiting female employees from
wearing pants is not a sex-based rule under Title VII).
187 For the most important articulation of this view, see Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins, 490
U.S. 228, 250 (1989) (plurality opinion) (“In the specific context of sex stereotyping, an
employer who acts on the basis of a belief that a woman cannot be aggressive, or that she must
not be, has acted on the basis of gender.”); see also Nichols v. Azteca Rest. Enters., Inc., 256
F.3d 864, 874 (9th Cir. 2001) (“Sexual harassment is actionable under Title VII to the extent it
occurs ‘because of’ the plaintiff’s sex.  Sanchez asserts that the verbal abuse at issue was based
upon the perception that he is effeminate and, therefore, occurred because of sex.  In short,
Sanchez contends that he was harassed because he failed to conform to a male stereotype. 
Sanchez’s theory derives from Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins, in which the Supreme Court held
that a woman who was denied partnership in an accounting firm because she did not match a sex
stereotype had an actionable claim under Title VII. . . . Sanchez contends that the holding in
Price Waterhouse applies with equal force to a man who is discriminated against for acting too
feminine.  We agree.”) (citations omitted); Katharine T. Bartlett, Only Girls Wear Barrettes:
Dress and Appearance Standards, Community Norms, and Workplace Equality, 92 MICH. L.
REV. 2541, 2559-60 (1994) (“Courts that decline to accept preemptive approaches to dress and
appearance restrictions based on judgments about their triviality must face the question whether
such restrictions discriminate ‘on the basis of sex.’ . . . In addressing the question, however,
courts again have tended to apply highly formal reasoning that accepts and builds upon
prevailing community norms rather than challenging them.”); Mary Anne C. Case,
Disaggregating Gender from Sex and Sexual Orientation: The Effeminate Man in the Law and
Feminist Jurisprudence, 105 YALE L.J. 1, 4 (1995) (“I argue that, at least under Title VII, the
existing statutory language and doctrinal categories, if correctly applied, already provide the
necessary protection to both effeminate men and feminine women, as well as their masculine
counterparts.”).
188 See, e.g., Rogers v. Am. Airlines, Inc., 527 F. Supp. 229, 231-32 (S.D.N.Y. 1981)
(holding that a rule prohibiting employees from wearing their hair in cornrows is not a race-based
rule under Title VII).
189 See, e.g., Paulette M. Caldwell, A Hair Piece: Perspectives on the Intersection of Race
and Gender, 1991 DUKE L.J. 365, 366 (“The case of Rogers v. American Airlines upheld the
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“sex” discrimination should also be interpreted to cover policies that penalize applicants or
employees because they do not conform to societal expectations about how women or men are
supposed to act.187  Similarly, some courts have suggested that Title VII’s prohibition on “race”
discrimination only covers policies that penalize applicants or employees for being a member of
a particular race,188 and some commentators have argued that Title VII’s “race” discrimination
prohibition should also be interpreted to cover an employment policy that penalizes applicants or
employees who wear their hair in cornrows.189  Some Title VII decisions indicate that Title VII’s
right of employers to prohibit categorically the wearing of braided hairstyles in the workplace. 
The plaintiff, a black woman, argued that American Airline’s policy discriminated against her
specifically as a black woman.  In effect, she based her claim on the interactive effects of racial
and gender discrimination.  The court chose, however, to base its decision principally on
distinctions between biological and cultural conceptions of race.  More importantly, it treated the
plaintiff’s claims of race and gender discrimination in the alternative and independent of each
other, thus denying any interactive relationship between the two.”) (footnote omitted).
190 See, e.g., Espinoza v. Farah Mfg. Co., 414 U.S. 86, 87-88 (1973) (“This case involves
interpretation of the phrase ‘national origin’ in Tit. VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964. . . . The
Court of Appeals . . . conclud[ed] that the statutory phrase ‘national origin’ did not embrace
citizenship.  We . . . affirm. . . . The term ‘national origin’ on its face refers to the country where
a person was born, or, more broadly, the country from which his or her ancestors came.”)
(citation omitted); id. at 95 (“[N]othing in the Act makes it illegal to discriminate on the basis of
citizenship or alienage.”).
191 See, e.g., Fragante v. City & County of Honolulu, 888 F.2d 591, 596 (9th Cir. 1989)
(holding that accent discrimination can constitute national origin discrimination under Title VII
when the plaintiff’s accent does not “interfere[] materially with job performance”); Mari J.
Matsuda, Voices of America: Accent, Antidiscrimination Law, and a Jurisprudence for the Last
Reconstruction, 100 YALE L.J. 1329, 1367-68 (1991) (arguing that courts deciding whether an
instance of accent discrimination constitutes discrimination under Title VII “should consider four
separate questions”: “1. What level of communication is required for the job?  2. Was the
candidate’s speech fairly evaluated?  3. Is the candidate intelligible to the pool of relevant,
nonprejudiced listeners, such that job performance is not unreasonably impeded?  4. What
accommodations are reasonable given the job and any limitations in intelligibility?”).
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prohibition on “national origin” discrimination only covers policies that penalize applicants or
employees for hailing from a foreign country,190 and some courts and commentators have
maintained that Title VII’s prohibition on “national origin” discrimination should also be
interpreted to cover some employment policies that penalize applicants or employees for
speaking with a foreign accent.191  This Article is not the place for an evaluation of the merits of
these arguments as a matter of interpreting Title VII, but the duty to mitigate issue discussed here
provides a new way to understand what is at stake in this debate.
The dispute now framed in terms of the appropriate definition of Title VII’s protected
classes can also be understood—perhaps more deeply—as a debate about mitigation.  The courts
and commentators who believe that some of the Title VII case law has defined the Title VII
protected classes too narrowly can be understood as arguing that this case law has functioned to
impose a duty to mitigate on Title VII plaintiffs, by requiring them to change or lessen aspects of
themselves that are part of their protected characteristics.  The courts that define the meaning of
the Title VII classes more strictly can be understood as contending that their Title VII
jurisprudence imposes no duty to mitigate, because it does not require an employee or applicant
to change anything that should count as part of a protected characteristic.  The unspoken premise
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that underlies both sides of this argument is that if expectations of feminine behavior from
women are part of what “sex” means, and if wearing one’s hair in certain styles is part of what
“race” means, and if having a foreign accent is part of what “national origin” means, then an
employee or applicant should not have to change those aspects of himself in order to secure
protection under Title VII.  Courts and commentators may dispute whether Title VII’s case law
currently imposes a duty to mitigate, but both sides of this debate implicitly agree that Title VII
should not impose such a duty.
Title VII plaintiffs should not have to change their protected characteristics, or lessen the
impact of their protected characteristics, because such a mitigation requirement would serve to
respect the very prejudices that Title VII seeks to contest.  As our exploration of the duty to
mitigate issue under Title I illustrates, imposing a duty to mitigate is only appropriate when it
serves legitimate interests under the operative statute.
CONCLUSION
The question of whether plaintiffs seeking the protection of Title I’s reasonable
accommodation provision should be under a duty to mitigate is important doctrinally, and it will
have to be decided.  But the issue of mitigation also helps cast light on Title I’s reasonable
accommodation provision, and a crucial difference between that provision and Title VII’s
prohibition on intentional discrimination.  Mitigation involves not only questions of costs and the
interests of employers versus employees and job applicants.  At its core, it is about which costs
and which interests an antidiscrimination statute recognizes as legitimate concerns, which
interests the statute identifies as merely a form of bias, and which costs the statute is willing to
impose as part of the price for combating discrimination.
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